United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BARBER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on “Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment” (Doc. # 18) and “Defendant
Waypoint's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” (Doc.
# 20), both filed on August 28, 2019. Each side filed
responses in opposition. (Doc. ## 21, 22). For the reasons
that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
facts are completely undisputed. Plaintiff Kerry Koehler
received cable and/or internet service from Bright House
Networks, LLC. On or about August 1, 2015, Koehler became
delinquent on her account.
in May 2016, Charter Communications, Inc. purchased Bright
House. On November 3, 2017, Defendant Waypoint Resource
Group, LLC entered into an agreement with Charter
Communications to collect certain account receivables,
including the debt owed by Koehler. On February 2, 2018,
Waypoint sent a written collection letter to Koehler. Then,
in May 2018, Waypoint reported the Koehler debt to one or
more CRAs electronically through a Metro 2 Format. Per
instructions from Charter Communications, Waypoint identified
“Charter Communications” in the data field for
the name of the creditor, which is titled “Original
Creditor.” Koehler filed this lawsuit on August 20,
2018, bringing a single count under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) against Waypoint. The premise of
Koehler's FDCPA claims is that Waypoint erred by
reporting the original creditor as “Charter
Communications” rather than “Bright House”
in its report to the CRAs. Koehler contends that this error
constitutes a “false and misleading
representation” or “unfair practice” in
violation of the FDCPA.
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A properly supported motion for summary
judgment is not defeated by the existence of a factual
dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). Only the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact will preclude summary judgment. Id.
moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there
are no genuine issues of material fact. Hickson Corp. v.
N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir.
2004). When the moving party has discharged its burden, the
nonmoving party must then designate specific facts showing
the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Jeffery
v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995). If there is a conflict between the parties'
allegations or evidence, the nonmoving party's evidence
is presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must be
drawn in the nonmoving party's favor. Shotz v. City
of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).
standard for cross-motions for summary judgment is not
different from the standard applied when only one party moves
for summary judgment. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United
States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). The Court
must consider each motion separately, resolving all
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under
consideration. Id. “Cross-motions for summary
judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in
granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not
genuinely disputed.” United States v. Oakley,
744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bricklayers
Int'l Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Koehler's FDCPA claims are based on Waypoint's error
in reporting the original creditor as “Charter
Communications” rather than “Bright House”
to the CRAs. However, several courts have concluded that
“allegations that a creditor did not follow industry
standards or otherwise erroneously reported information to a
CRA [are] insufficient to state a claim under the
FDCPA.” Dash v. Midland Funding LLC, Case No.
8:16-cv-2128-T-36AAS, 2017 WL 841116, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
3, 2017); see, e.g., Lee v. Sec. Check,
LLC, Case No. 3:09-CV-421-J-12TEM, 2010 WL 3075673, at
*8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2010) (“The [FDCPA] does not
purport to impose civil liability for furnishing erroneous
information to a credit reporting agency or for failing to
correct erroneous information provided to a credit reporting
agency.”); Acosta v. Campbell, Case No.
6:04-cv-761-Orl-28DAB, 2006 WL 146208, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
18, 2006) (“The FDCPA does not prohibit a debt
collector from communicating to agencies, and a
communication, in and of itself, to a consumer reporting
agency, does not support a cause of action under the
FDCPA.”). The Court finds the reasoning and analysis
presented in these cases persuasive. As such, the Court
concludes that Koehler's allegations, as a matter of law,
are insufficient to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA.
Consequently, Koehler's Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied, and Waypoint's Motion for Summary Judgment is