United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER
E. STEELE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on defendant Kevin
Rambosk's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #126) filed
on June 24, 2019. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #135) on
July 8, 2019, defendant Kevin Rambosk filed a Reply (Doc.
#139) on July 24, 2019, and plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply (Doc.
#140) on July 29, 2019. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is granted.
judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is
‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party.” Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R”
Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). A fact
is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the
suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A court must
decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.'” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co.,
Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all
evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007); Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 772
(11th Cir. 2010). However, “if reasonable minds might
differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then
the court should deny summary judgment.” St.
Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken
Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999)(quoting
Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695
F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)(finding summary judgment
“may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on
the basic facts, but disagree about the factual inferences
that should be drawn from these facts”)). “If a
reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw
more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference
introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court
should not grant summary judgment.” Allen v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
2, 2018, plaintiff Robert Dale Harris (Plaintiff) filed an
Amended Complaint (Doc. #51) against defendant Kevin Rambosk
(Sheriff Rambosk) in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Collier County. The Amended Complaint asserts two claims
against Sheriff Rambosk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I
and XV), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
rights as a result of Sheriff Rambosk's failure to
properly train his deputies. The undisputed
facts are as follows:
The March 9, 2014 Trespass Warning to the CCSO
March 9, 2014, Plaintiff called the Collier County
Sheriff's Office (CCSO) to complain about Deputy Michael
D. Chapman (Deputy Chapman). (Doc. #113, p. 3; Doc. #135, p.
2.) Plaintiff complained that while he was sitting outside of
a McDonald's in Naples, Florida, Deputy Chapman
threatened to trespass Plaintiff from “all local
businesses.” (Id.) Sergeant Bartolome Amengual
(Sergeant Amengual) and Deputy Kasey P. Wingo (Deputy Wingo)
arrived at the scene and took Plaintiff's complaint.
The April 4, 2014 Arrest
April 4, 2014, Plaintiff was repairing his friend Randy Leon
Sulwilcowski's motorcycle that was warehoused at a
storage facility in Naples, Florida. (Doc. #113, pp. 3-4;
Doc. #135, p. 3.) Deputies Chapman and Wingo encountered
Plaintiff as he was exiting the storage facility.
(Id.) Deputies Wingo and Chapman ultimately arrested
Plaintiff and engaged in a physical with Plaintiff while
placing him under arrest. (Doc. #113, pp. 5-7; Doc. #135, p.
3.) Deputy Pepin arrived at the scene to assist Deputies
Wingo and Chapman with Plaintiff's arrest. (Doc. #113, p.
6; Doc. #135, p. 3.) Deputy Pepin struck Plaintiff's back
several times with a baton and deployed his Taser into
Plaintiff's back. (Doc. #113, p. 6; Doc. #135, p. 3.)
was ultimately charged with three (3) counts of battery on a
police officer; one (1) count of assault on a police officer;
one (1) count of resisting an officer without violence; and
one (1) count of loitering and prowling. (Doc. #51,
¶¶ 59-62; Doc. #135, p. 3.) On April 17, 2014, the
State Attorney's Office filed a “Not Filing
Charge” on all six counts. (Doc. #113, p. 8; Doc. #135,
The May 29, 2014 Trespass Warning
29, 2014, CCSO Deputy Ross Anthony (Deputy Anthony) issued
Plaintiff two trespass warnings: one for a Waffle House
restaurant located at 3824 Tollhouse Drive in Naples,
Florida, and one for a Shell gas station located at 3825
Tollgate Boulevard in Naples, Florida. (Doc. #126, p. 3;
Doc. #135, p. 4.) Plaintiff purchased cigarettes from the
Shell gas station, sat outside for approximately five
minutes, observed Deputy Anthony approaching, and entered the
Waffle House. (Id.) Deputy Anthony testified that he
approached Plaintiff because he had issued Plaintiff a
trespass warning for the Shell gas station “a couple of
weeks prior.” (Doc. #135-16, p. 14.)
Anthony then entered the Waffle House, requested that
Plaintiff leave the Waffle House to speak with him outside,
and placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and took him outside the
Waffle House. (Doc. #126, pp. 3-4; Doc. #135, pp. 4-5.)
Deputy Anthony issued Plaintiff a trespass warning for the
Waffle House restaurant at the request of a Waffle House
employee. (Doc. #126, p. 4; Doc. #135, p. 17.) The Shell gas
station employees asked Plaintiff to leave the premises, and
the trespass warning lists Ben Bagheri, the Shell gas station
owner, as the “Name of Complainant.” (Doc.
#126-1, p. 1; Doc. #126, p. 4; Doc. #135, p. 17.)
The June 10, 2014 ...