FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Barbara
L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court adjudicated B.M.
guilty of two delinquent acts: (1) carrying a concealed
weapon by a person under twenty-four years of age who was
previously found to have committed a delinquent act that
would be a felony if committed by an adult, a violation of
section 790.23(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016); and (2) being
a minor in possession of a firearm, a violation of section
790.22(3). We reverse the adjudications because the State
presented insufficient evidence to prove them. We remand for
the trial court to vacate the disposition
regard to the count for carrying a concealed weapon, there
are two methods of proving a prior felony conviction when the
existence of the conviction is an element of the present
offense. Landrum v. State, 149 So.3d 98, 99-100
(Fla. 4th DCA 2014). They are: (1) admission of the whole
record pertaining to the previous conviction or (2) a
certified copy of the prior judgment of conviction in
conformance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986.
Landrum, 149 So.3d at 99-100. Here, the State
endeavored to prove, by introducing prior disposition orders,
that B.M. had been found to have committed delinquent
acts. When asked by the trial court, B.M.'s
counsel stated that she did not object to the introduction of
that evidence. But at the close of the State's case she
moved for a judgment of dismissal of the concealed weapon
charge on the ground that the State had failed to prove that
B.M. was the person named in the earlier disposition orders.
The trial court should have granted that motion.
certified copy of a judgment does not need further
authentication to be admitted into evidence. A certified copy
of an official public record is self-authenticating under
section 90.902(4), Florida Statutes (2003), and needs no
additional foundation other than what is required for a valid
certification in that subsection." Moncus v.
State, 69 So.3d 341, 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). However:
When the State must establish the existence of a prior
conviction to prove an essential element of an offense,
merely introducing a judgment, which shows identity between
the name on the prior judgment and the name of the defendant,
is insufficient. Instead, the State must present affirmative
evidence that the defendant and the person named on the prior
judgment are the same person. This requirement is rooted in
the requirement that the State prove the defendant guilty of
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. (citations omitted). Here, the State adduced no
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.M. was the
person named in the prior disposition orders.
State argues that by failing to object to the introduction of
the copies of the disposition orders when the prosecutor
advised the court that they indicated the lengthy past of
B.M., B.M. stipulated that he was the person named therein.
But under materially identical circumstances, in
Sinkfield v. State, 592 So.2d 322, 322-23 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1992), the court reversed Sinkfield's conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm. At Sinkfield's
trial, the State offered a prior judgment into evidence.
Id. at 322. Then:
The court specifically asked defense counsel if he had any
objection to the introduction of the judgment into evidence.
Counsel responded, without qualification, "No objection,
Your Honor." At the close of the state's case, the
defense moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the
state had not proved that the "Paul Sinkfield"
named in the certified copy was the same person on trial. The
judge took the motion under advisement and sent the case to
the jury, which convicted Sinkfield as charged. The motion
was later denied.
Id. at 322-23 The Sinkfield court reversed
the conviction even though defense counsel specifically
stated that he had no objection to the introduction of the
prior conviction. Id. at 323. Accordingly, we
reverse B.M.'s adjudication on the concealed weapon
the adjudication for being a minor in possession of a
firearm, B.M. argues on appeal, as he did below, that the
State did not prove that he was under eighteen years of age,
a necessary element of the charge. When asked at the
adjudicatory hearing how old B.M. was, the arresting officer
testified merely that "[h]e was seventeen, I
believe." B.M.'s objection to speculation was
overruled. The officer's testimony was insufficient to
establish that B.M. was a minor at the time he possessed a
firearm. The officer did not testify that B.M. told him his
age. He did not indicate that he previously knew B.M., nor
did he provide his date of birth. The State contends that it
proved B.M.'s age through the introduction of the prior
orders of ...