final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Mark H.
Jones, Judge Lower Tribunal No. 11-1072-A-K.
Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., and Michael Ufferman
(Tallahassee), for appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, and Jonathan Tanoos, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
SCALES, LINDSEY, and MILLER,  JJ.
Erik Hedvall appeals his conviction and sentence for the
murder of Jonathan Perez. For the reasons set forth below, we
BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The Investigation and Events Leading to Trial
Perez (the "Victim") was brutally murdered in 2011
in Key West during Fantasy Fest. He was found lying on a
driveway under a vending truck parked approximately 100 feet
from Don's Place, a bar in downtown Key West. A pool of
blood was flowing from the Victim's head toward the
street. There was a large wound just above his right ear.
Glittery costume wings were wrapped tightly around his neck.
A large coral rock, stained with blood, was discovered near
the Victim's body. The injuries were consistent with a
time of death between 4:00 a.m. and 4:15 a.m. the morning of
October 28, 2011.
medical examiner's autopsy of the Victim revealed that a
firm metal wire covered in cloth, which was part of the
costume wings, was wrapped around the Victim's neck. The
wire had been twisted very tightly. The Victim had bruising
on his face, hand, wrist, elbow, and chest. The Victim also
had lacerations on his scalp. In addition, the Victim had
suffered skull fractures and bruising to the brain. The
injuries were consistent with the Victim's head being hit
with a hard object. The causes of death were asphyxiation and
blunt force head trauma, although either alone would have
caused his death. The medical examiner opined that the manner
of death was homicide.
detective looked through the Victim's mobile phone and
Facebook page to confirm his identity. Word of the murder
began to spread in the community, and individuals who knew
the Victim began contacting the police. The detective
interviewed some of the Victim's friends and began
developing leads on the case. Ultimately, the investigation
led to Don's Place. A bartender saw Peter Erik Hedvall
("Defendant") at Don's Place early in the
evening the night of the murder wearing a pinstriped
"zoot suit" with a big wide hat. The bartender
first saw the Victim around 1:30 a.m. or 2:00 a.m. and served
him a drink. The Victim left without paying. Around 3:45
a.m., close to last call, the bartender saw the Victim again.
Defendant was sitting at the end of the bar, while the Victim
was standing at the middle of the bar. The Victim appeared
another bartender also saw the Victim earlier in the evening
wearing all black with glittery fairy wings. A friend of the
Victim confirmed she met the Victim at Don's Place that
night and that he was dressed in black and wearing costume
wings. The friend last saw the Victim around 3:45 a.m., just
before she left. Another patron remembered seeing the Victim
that night and stated that he was wearing wings and appeared
drunk. Yet another patron who worked at Wing Masters, just in
front of Don's Place, went to Don's Place and left
around 3:55 or 4:00 a.m., when the bartender announced last
call. As he was walking home, this person saw an argument
between two people by the dumpster next to Don's Place.
According to this person, one sharply-dressed man was wearing
a white suit, a hat, and white pants. The other man was
wearing all black and wings.
hours after the Victim's body was found, Defendant went
to the police station for an interview. During the interview,
he acknowledged being at Don's Place the morning of
October 28, 2011, and seeing the Victim, but he denied
arguing with him. In addition, Defendant admitted he was
wearing a white and blue zoot suit and a hat. Police asked to
go with Defendant to his home to get the clothing and
Defendant agreed. Defendant retrieved the clothing and boots
he had worn the night the Victim died and returned to the
station with the police. Once there, a detective visually
inspected the clothing items and boots in the presence of
Defendant and immediately noticed what appeared to be dry
bloodstains on the pants. Another detective then came in
wearing gloves, and Defendant was asked if she could take the
clothing to inspect it. He agreed. A presumptive blood test
was conducted, which came back positive for the presence of
blood. A detective then read Defendant his constitutional
rights. Defendant was not arrested and was allowed to leave
the police station.
clothing and boots and the Victim's costume wings were
submitted to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for
DNA testing. Multiple samples were submitted, including
Defendant's and the Victim's DNA. Swabs from the
crime scene, including stains from the coral rock found near
the victim, were also submitted. One blood stain on the back
of Defendant's pants matched the Victim. A second blood
stain, above the toe of Defendant's right boot also
matched at least two individuals, the Victim being one of
them. Two blood stains found on Defendant's clothing
matched Defendant. Blood taken from the coral rock matched
the Victim. Defendant was subsequently arrested and indicted
for premeditated murder in violation of section 782.04(1)(a),
The Motion to Suppress
trial, Defendant moved to have the clothing and DNA evidence
suppressed on the basis that the detectives exceeded the
scope of consent he had given them. At the hearing on the
motion, two detectives testified, and the State admitted
three video recordings of the police's interactions with
Defendant. The trial court entered a written order denying
jury selection, Defendant challenged three jurors, F, S, and
for cause, alleging they were neither impartial nor unbiased.
After an extensive jury selection and multiple rounds of
questioning, the trial court denied the cause challenges.
Defendant exercised peremptory challenges to strike the three
jurors from the jury panel. At the conclusion of voir dire,
and after Defendant's peremptory challenges had been
exhausted, Defendant identified two additional jurors who sat
on the jury whom he would have stricken had he not used three
of his peremptory challenges on Jurors F, S, and H.
Testimony on Blood Pattern Analysis
to trial, the State submitted a discovery exhibit in
accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220,
which included a list of "Category A" witnesses. It
listed Detective Underwood and attached a copy of Detective
Underwood's Report. In addition, the State submitted an
amended discovery exhibit with Detective Underwood's
curriculum vitae. Further, Detective Underwood was deposed.
Detective Underwood's Report included the following:
There was a large pool of blood under the Victim's head
and what appeared to be high velocity blood splatter
extending from the Victim's head/face towards the street
for a total distance of four feet in a cone like shape
(expanding outwards from the Victim's head/face towards
the street). There was a barely perceptible void in the
pattern, suggesting that someone or something had been
present when the splatter, from the blow to the head was
struck. The shape and size of the splatter droplets were
elongated, definitely directional, and indicated a flight
pattern of less than thirty degrees, away from the
Victim's head. No 'cast off' patterns were
observed. Swabs were collected from areas of bloodstains.
Evidence at the scene suggest that the head wound was a
single blow and was struck while the Victim's head was
already down on the driveway surface.
trial, the State tendered Detective Underwood as an expert
witness. Defendant objected, asserting the State had failed
to identify Detective Underwood as an expert and that
Defendant would be prejudiced if the trial court allowed the
detective to testify to his blood pattern analysis. At a
hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court
declined Defendant's request for a Daubert
hearing on the basis that Defendant could have filed a motion
"a long time ago."
in lieu thereof, the trial court required the State to lay a
predicate for Detective Underwood's testimony. The trial
court identified the following expert opinion testimony
requirements under section 90.702, Florida Statutes: (1) the
testimony must be based on sufficient facts or data; (2) the
testimony must be the product of reliable principles and
methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
objected on the basis that the witness was not qualified to
testify to the methodology and principles. Defendant further
objected to the reliability of the principles and methods
used by the detective. The trial court then told the State
that the detective needed to address the reliability issue.
The trial court allowed Defendant to conduct further voir
dire of Detective Underwood. In addition, the trial court
conducted its own examination. The trial court then
I'm going to allow the detective to testify to his
opinion. You'll [sic] been given a chance to
cross-examine him on many of the issues he's raised. The
Court finds that the detective followed the methods and
measurements and that the measurements are reliable as far as
we know from the experts that's [sic] he's quoted,
who wrote the books, so to speak.
I'm going to find he used sufficient facts and data under
the circumstances as he was taught. I'm going to find
that he applied them reliably to the facts as presented.
The only thing I find him able to testify to is the 30 degree
angle he's talked about, and his conclusion that the
trajectory is one that would indicate that the victim's
body was at a very low position, or on the ground when it was
detective rendered his expert opinion and Defendant
cross-examined the detective on his opinion in front of the
Testimony of the Medical Examiner
Jay Radke, a medical examiner licensed in the State of
Florida, testified that his examination of the left side of
the Victim's scalp revealed hemorrhaging and that
hemorrhaging was consistent with the Victim's head being
hit on the left side by a hard object such as a sidewalk. Dr.
Radke also identified multiple broken fragments of skull. He
opined that blunt force trauma to the right side of the
Victim's head was caused by an irregularly shaped object.
Dr. Radke also explained that a single blow to the head would
not cause blood to travel four feet from the Victim and that
an initial blow to the head would not cause any blood to fly
out or spurt. Dr. Radke also testified that a subsequent blow
to the head would cause already pooling blood to splash and
Evidence of Glitter and Debris from Defendant's
to trial, in July of 2013, the State and counsel for
Defendant met with Detective Haley to inspect Defendant's
clothing that was in the State's possession. During this
inspection the clothing was placed on a clean piece of brown
paper. The brown paper caught debris that fell from the
clothing. Once the inspection was completed, the paper was
repackaged with the clothing. Only Detective Haley handled
the clothing during the original inspection.
on March 22, 2014, a second inspection was conducted by the
State; counsel for Defendant; and Ms. Varan, a DNA expert.
When the inspection was completed, counsel for Defendant
allowed the State to discard the new piece of brown paper
that was placed under the clothing during the inspection.
After counsel for Defendant left, a third inspection was held
(also on March 22, 2014.) A third piece of brown paper was
placed under the clothing during the inspection. This piece
of paper was repackaged with the clothing and the paper from
the first inspection.
trial, the State sought to move both pieces of brown paper
into evidence and argued that the debris found on the paper
came from the coral rock and the wings worn by Defendant. The
trial court admitted the brown paper over the Defendant's
objection. In so doing, the trial court found that Defendant
and counsel had access to inspect (1) the clothing; (2) the
paper placed under the clothing; (3) any loose debris that
had fallen during the two inspections they were present for
prior to trial; and (4) the debris collected during the third
inspection before it was admitted into evidence. The trial
court further found that Defendant had deposed the DNA
expert, Mrs. Varan, the day following the second and third
conclusion of trial, and after testimony from more than 25
witnesses, including Defendant, the jury convicted Defendant
of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to 40 years imprisonment
followed by probation for life. This timely appeal followed.
alleges five grounds for reversal: (1) the trial court erred
by allowing the testimony of Detective Underwood, who
Defendant contends was an undesignated and unqualified expert
witness for the State; (2) the trial court erred by denying
Defendant's challenges for cause to Jurors F, S, and H;
(3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce
glitter and debris from the clothing Defendant wore on the
night of the murder; (4) the trial court erred in denying
Defendant's motion to suppress the clothing Defendant
wore on the night of the murder; and (5) there are errors on
the sentencing scoresheet and the judgment.
The Expert Blood Pattern Analysis Testimony
The Alleged Discovery Violation and Failure to Conduct a
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1)(A) requires the State
to disclose "a list of the names and addresses of all
persons known to the prosecutor to have information that may
be relevant to any offense charged or any defense thereto . .
. ." The Rule further requires that the persons listed
be designated in one of three categories: A, B, or C.
Id. Category A, which is relevant here, lists eight
subcategories of witnesses, including "expert witnesses
who have not provided a written report and a curriculum vitae
or who are going to testify." Fla. R. Crim. P.
alleges the trial court erred in allowing Detective Underwood
to testify as an expert on blood pattern analysis because
even though he was designated as a Category A witness, he was
not specifically designated as an expert witness. This,
Defendant argues, was a discovery violation requiring the
trial court to conduct a Richardson
hearing. See Richardson v. State, 246
So.2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1971) ("[T]he violation of a rule
of procedure prescribed by this Court does not call for a
reversal of a conviction unless the record discloses that
non-compliance with the rule resulted in prejudice or harm to
the defendant."). The State contends that listing
Detective Underwood as a Category A witness was sufficient,
and therefore, a Richardson hearing was unnecessary
because there was no violation of a procedural rule.
we note that the plain language of Rule 3.220 does not
require the State to identify any witness specifically as an
expert or provide an expert witness list, we need not decide
whether the State complied with the requirements of Rule
3.220 because, even if it did not, the failure to do so was
harmless error.  "[T]he failure to conduct a
Richardson hearing is not per se reversible error,
but rather is subject to a harmless error analysis."
Durrance v. State, 44 So.3d 217, 221 (Fla. 4th DCA
2010) (citing State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016,
1020-21 (Fla. 1995)). A discovery violation may be considered
harmless if an appellate court can determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defense was not procedurally
prejudiced by the violation. Casica v. State, 24
So.3d 1236, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing Scipio v.
State, 928 So.2d 1138, 1150 (Fla. 2006)).
arguendo, there was a discovery violation, there is
no evidence that this violation resulted in Defendant's
trial preparation or strategy being materially impaired.
First, Defendant was given the opportunity to depose
Detective Underwood on his report and opinions. The State
also provided Detective Underwood's curriculum vitae and
report. Second, Defendant's theory of the case was not
how the victim was killed but that someone,
other than Defendant, killed the victim. Third, in his
opening statement, counsel for Defendant stated that the
Victim "was brutally taken from us." Fourth, even
if Defendant did not anticipate Detective Underwood would
render the opinion that he did, his opinion could not have
changed Defendant's preparation or strategy in light of
the cumulative medical examiner's testimony that the
causes of death were asphyxiation and blunt force trauma to
the head. Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendant would
have hired an expert of his own to rebut the testimony of
Detective Underwood. Defendant was aware prior to trial that
Detective Underwood's testimony would be based on the
findings in his report because he had been deposed.
Defendant was not required to abandon his theory of the case,
i.e., that the State had charged the wrong person, mid-trial.
Detective Underwood's testimony had no material bearing
on Defendant's theory of identity. It was only material
to the issue of the cause of death. Even if the State's
failure to explicitly identify Detective Underwood as an
expert was a discovery violation, given the evidence
presented during the trial, we cannot find that such failure
prejudiced Defendant. See Scott v. State, 230 So.3d
613, 618 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ("[A] discovery violation
may be considered harmless if an appellate court can
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defense was
not procedurally prejudiced by the violation." (citing
Casica, 24 So.3d at 1240)); Austin v.
State, 199 So.3d 327, 329 n.5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
(finding that even if the trial court's failure to
conduct a Richardson hearing was erroneous, the
error "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
The Daubert Standard
further alleges the trial court's decision to allow
Detective Underwood to provide an expert opinion is grounds
for reversal because the court failed to determine whether he
was a qualified expert pursuant to the Daubert
standard set forth in section 90.702, Florida Statutes
(2019). We disagree. "In 2013, the Florida
Legislature amended Section 90.702 to pattern it after Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Ch. 2013-107, Laws of
Fla." L.L. v. State, 189 So.3d 252, 255 (Fla.
3d DCA 2016). As amended, section 90.702, Florida Statutes
provides as follows:
90.702 Testimony by experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in
determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
Legislature amended section 90.702 "to adopt the
standards for expert testimony in the courts of this state as
provided in Daubert v. Merrell DowPharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997),
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), and to no longer apply the standard in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923) in the courts
of this state . . . ." Ch. 2013-107, Laws of Fla.
(Preamble to § 90.702). As this Court has previously
explained, "Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho Tire, known as the Daubert trilogy,
are the three United States Supreme Court cases that together
articulate the Daubert standard."
L.L., 189 So.3d at 256. "When engaging in a
Daubert analysis, the judge's role is that of
the evidentiary 'gatekeeper,' that is, the one who
determines whether the expert's testimony meets the
Daubert test." Bookerv. Sumter
Cty. Sheriff's Office/N. Am. Risk Servs., 166 So.3d
189, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Daubert, 509
U.S. at 597; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). "[A]
trial court has broad discretion in determining how to
perform its gatekeeper function when addressing the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony." Id.
(citing Club Car, Inc. ...