FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
Michelle Sisco, Judge - Case No. 292004CF012631000AHC
Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer of Samuels Parmer Law Firm, P.A.,
Tampa, Florida, for Appellant
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Christina
Z. Pacheco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for
Grover Brant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the
circuit court's order summarily denying his successive
motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
conduct arising from the 2004 killing of Sara Radfar,
"Brant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, sexual
battery, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and
burglary with assault or battery." Brant v.
State, 21 So.3d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 2009). "After a
failed attempt to seat a penalty-phase jury . . . Brant
waived his right to a jury, and the penalty phase proceeded
before the trial judge." Brant v. State, 197
So.3d 1051, 1057 (Fla. 2016).
trial judge "sentenced Brant to death for the murder,
concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the sexual battery,
kidnapping, and burglary, and five years' imprisonment
for the grand theft." Id. at 1062.
affirmed Brant's convictions and sentences on direct
appeal in 2009. Brant, 21 So.3d at 1289. In 2014,
Brant appealed the denial of his initial motion for
postconviction relief and filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Brant, 197 So.3d at 1056. While his
case was pending in this Court, the United States Supreme
Court issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136
S.Ct. 616 (2016). Accordingly, we permitted Brant "to
file supplemental briefing to address the impact of
Hurst on his sentence." Brant, 197
So.3d at 1079. In 2016, we rejected Brant's Hurst v.
Florida claim, affirmed the denial of his initial
postconviction motion, and denied his habeas petition.
Brant, 197 So.3d at 1079.
2017, Brant filed a successive postconviction motion, arguing
that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Hurst
v. Florida and Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40
(Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2161 (2017).
The circuit court summarily denied the motion. Brant
appealed, and we directed the parties to show cause why the
circuit court's order should not be affirmed based on
Mullens v. State, 197 So.3d 16 (Fla. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 672 (2017).
conclude that the circuit court properly denied relief.
Brant's claim is procedurally barred to the extent it was
raised in his earlier postconviction appeal, see
Brant, 197 So.3d at 1079, and additionally fails on the
merits. In Mullens, we held that a defendant's
waiver of his right to a penalty phase jury was not rendered
invalid by the subsequent changes in the law wrought by
Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State.
Mullens, 197 So.3d at 38-40. Since issuing
Mullens, we have consistently reaffirmed the
principle that a defendant who waives his or her right to a
penalty phase jury is not entitled to relief under the
Hurst decisions. See, e.g., Lynch v.
State, 254 So.3d 312, 322 (Fla. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S.Ct. 1266 (2019); Hutchinson v.
State, 243 So.3d 880, 883 (Fla.), cert. denied,
139 S.Ct. 261 (2018); Rodgers v. State, 242 So.3d
276, 276-77 (Fla.), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 592
(2018); Allred v. State, 230 So.3d 412, 413 (Fla.
2017); Dessaure v. State, 230 So.3d 411, 412 (Fla.
2017). Brant is among those defendants who validly waived the
right to a penalty phase jury, see Brant, 197 So.3d
at 1076, and his arguments do not compel departing from our
we affirm the circuit court's order summarily denying
Brant's successive motion for postconviction relief.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and