United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
ORDER
BRIAN
J. DAVIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Through
a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. 1)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Abraham Fredrick Brown, an
inmate of the Florida penal system, challenges his state
court (Duval County) conviction for burglary (occupied
dwelling), violation of injunction for protection against
domestic violence, interference with custody, and shooting or
throwing deadly missile, [1] and criminal mischief. Petition at 1.
Respondents filed an Answer in Response to Order to Show
Cause (Response) (Doc. 12).[2] Petitioner filed a notice that he
did not intend to file a reply (Doc. 15) but would rely on
the Petition.
II.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Petitioner
raises one ground in the Petition and seeks an evidentiary
hearing. Petition at 5, 8-9. It is Petitioner's burden to
establish a need for an evidentiary hearing. See Chavez
v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057,
1060 (11th Cir. 2011) (opining a petitioner bears the burden
of establishing the need for an evidentiary hearing with more
than speculative and inconcrete claims of need), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 1120 (2012). The Court finds no need for an
evidentiary hearing as the pertinent facts are fully
developed in this record or the record otherwise precludes
habeas relief. As such, the Court can "adequately assess
[Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual
development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247,
1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004).
Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474
(2007).
III.
THE CLAIM
One
ground is raised in the Petition. Petitioner contends he has
been denied due process of law pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments because he was sentenced as a
habitual felony offender although the state lacked the proper
prior offenses to satisfy the requirements for a habitual
offender sentence. Petition at 5-9.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs
a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute "imposes
important limitations on the power of federal courts to
overturn the judgments of state courts in criminal
cases." Shoop v. Hill, 139 S.Ct. 504, 506
(2019) (per curiam). The AEDPA statute: "respects the
authority and ability of state courts and their dedication to
the protection of constitutional rights." Id.
Therefore, "[u]nder AEDPA, error is not enough; even
clear error is not enough." Meders v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2019)
(citing Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728
(2017) (per curiam)), cert. denied, No. 19-5438, 2019 WL
5150550 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019).
Applying
the statute as amended by AEDPA, federal courts may not grant
habeas relief unless one of the claims: "(1)'was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,' or (2) 'was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.' 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Nance v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1300-1301 (11th Cir.
2019).
Thus,
in order to obtain habeas relief, the state court decision
must unquestionably conflict with Supreme Court precedent.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). If
some fair-minded jurists could agree with the lower
court's decision, habeas relief must be denied. Meders,
911 F.3d at 1351. As noted in Richter, unless the petitioner
shows the state court's ruling was so lacking in
justification that there was error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fair-minded disagreement, there is no entitlement to habeas
relief. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19-20 (2013).
In
undertaking its review, this Court is not obliged "to
flyspeck the state court order or grade it." Meders, 911
F.3d at 1349. Indeed, specificity and thoroughness of the
state court decision is not required; even if the state court
fails to provide rationale or reasoning, AEDPA deference is
due "absent a conspicuous misapplication of Supreme
Court precedent." Id. at 1350 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Of
importance, a state court's finding of fact, whether a
state trial court or appellate court, is entitled to a
presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
But, this presumption of correctness applies only to findings
of fact, not mixed determinations of law and fact.
Brannan v. GDCP Warden, 541 Fed.Appx. 901, 903-904
(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (recognizing the distinction
between a pure question of fact from a mixed question of law
and fact), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 906 (2014).
Where
there has been one reasoned state court judgment rejecting a
federal claim followed by an unexplained order upholding that
judgement, federal habeas courts employ a "look
through" presumption: "the federal court should
'look through' the unexplained decision to the last
related state-court decision that does provide a relevant
rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained
...