United States District Court, S.D. Florida
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CAUSE is before the Court upon the Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Reid (the
“Report”). See ECF No. . This action
was previously referred to the Honorable Lisette M. Reid for
a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters.
See ECF Nos. , .
filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. ECF No.  (“Petition”). In the
Petition, Petitioner argues that his counsel ineffectively
stipulated to the admission of his statement, which was
obtained through coercive tactics, for impeachment purposes
October 7, 2019, Judge Reid issued the Report recommending
that the Petition, be denied on the merits, that no
certificate of appealability be issued, that final judgment
be entered, and that the case should be closed. ECF No. ,
at 14. The Report advised that any objections to the
Report's findings were due within fourteen days of
receipt of the Report. Id. Plaintiff has timely
filed objections to the Report. See ECF No. 
Court has conducted a de novo review of the portions
of the Report to which Petitioner has objected, in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and the remainder of the
Report for clear error, and finds that the Objections are
without merit and are therefore overruled. Taylor v.
Cardiovascular Specialists, P.C., 4 F.Supp.3d 1374, 1377
(N.D.Ga. 2014) (citing United States v. Slay, 714
F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983)). The Court first notes that
Petitioner's Objections are improper, as they are either
a recitation of arguments originally raised in his Petition
and considered by the Magistrate Judge or are merely
disagreements with the Report's findings.
Petitioner maintains that his “custodial statement was
[obtained] thru coercive tactics, ” and further that
the trial court should have “concluded that
Defendant's statement was involuntary.” ECF No.
, at 2-3. Petitioner also objects to the Magistrate
Judge's finding that the Petitioner failed to show any
prejudice related to the trial court's ruling that his
statement could be used at his trial for impeachment
purposes. Id. at 3.
careful review, the objections are improper because they
merely expand upon and reframe arguments already made and
considered by the Magistrate Judge in her Report, or simply
disagree with the Report's conclusions. “It is
improper for an objecting party to ... submit [ ] papers to a
district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the
same arguments and positions taken in the original papers
submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not
to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple' when
they file objections to a [Report and
Recommendations].” Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod,
No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21,
2012) (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps.
Pension Plan, 806 F.Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
Petitioner's first contention that the trial court should
have found that his custodial statement was obtained through
coercive tactics and thus was involuntary, such objection is
improper as it relitigates the same arguments raised in the
Petition, and Petitioner's Reply. See ECF No.
, at 5 (“It was illogical for counsel to rescind
this celebrated victory . . . whereas statement were found to
be involuntary because they were obtained through coercive
tactics”); see also ECF No. , at 5
(“Issue at Hand . . . involves the involuntariness of
statement ruled by judge . . . Petitioner['s] . . .
statements which have been found to be involuntary because
they have been found to be obtained through coercive
tactics.”). The Court also notes that the trial
court's ruling at the hearing on the voluntariness of
Petitioner's statement was consistent with United States
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, a voluntary statement can be
admissible for impeachment purposes, despite a substantive
violation of a defendant's Miranda rights having
occurred. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
as the Report details, the record reflects that the trial
court considered the Petitioner's recorded statement to
police that he wanted to speak with law enforcement and had
not been threaten or forced to do so. See ECF No.
, at 2; see also ECF [16-1], at 29:13-30:21.
Thus, this Court finds that the record supports the trial
court's (and the Report's) conclusion that the
Petitioner's statement to police was voluntary.
Petitioner's objection to the Report's finding that
the Petitioner failed to show any prejudice related to
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Court finds that
it is also improper. Indeed, the sole ground raised in the
Petition was a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
related to the attorney's stipulation that the
Petitioner's statement could be introduced for
impeachment at trial. ECF No. , at 5. Further, this
stipulation was made after the trial court rendered its
ruling on the voluntariness of the Petitioner's
statement. Thus, any objection by counsel to the
statement's introduction would have been futile. Beyond
his conclusory objection that the Report was erroneous, and
even assuming that his counsel was deficient for making the
stipulation, Petitioner fails to articulate how the
stipulation was prejudicial in light of the overwhelming
evidence the jury considered at the Petitioner's trial.
Petitioner's Objections are silent as to how the
introduction of his statement was substantially influential
to the jury in returning the guilty verdict.
close review of the record and the law, the Court finds that
Petitioner's objections are due to be overruled. The
Court has conducted a de novo review of Judge
Reid's Report, the record and applicable law, and is
otherwise fully advised. See Williams v. McNeil, 557
F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)). Upon review of the record and the Report, the
Court finds Judge Reid's Report to be well reasoned and
correct, and the Court agrees with the its analysis.
it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
Judge Reid's Report and Recommendation, ECF ...