final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
of Accident: May 2, 1976.
appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
Nolan S. Winn, Judge.
McCabe of William J. McCabe, P.A., Longwood, and Douglas H.
Glicken, Orlando, for Appellant.
L. Said of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman, Waters
& Traverso, Pensacola, for Appellee.
workers' compensation case, Samuel Phillips
("Claimant") appeals an order of the Judge of
Compensation Claims ("JCC") denying his claims for
benefits as barred by the statute of limitations. On the
unique facts of this case, we reverse and remand for further
compensable injury occurred more than 40 years ago. His
employer administratively accepted Claimant as permanently
and totally disabled (PTD) in 1986 and paid PTD
benefits. In 1987, the Division of Workers'
Compensation began paying Claimant PTD supplemental benefits,
as authorized by section 440.15(1)(f), Florida Statutes.
See Dep't of Children & Families v. Monroe,
744 So.2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ("The purpose
of supplemental benefits is to allow for increases in the
cost of living."). For unknown reasons, when Claimant
started receiving supplemental benefit payments from the
Division, he stopped receiving PTD benefit payments from his
2018, Claimant filed the first of several petitions for
benefits seeking medical and disability benefits from 1986
"to the present and continuing." The JCC denied the
petition, ruling the statute of limitations had run before
the claims were filed. The JCC found that although the
supplemental benefits are compensation, the statutory
obligation to pay them rests with the Division, not the
employer; therefore, the JCC concluded, those payments did
not toll the statute of limitations. We disagree.
statute of limitations applicable to Claimant is the version
in effect on Claimant's date of accident. Batista v.
Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 993 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2008). That version provides as follows:
The right to compensation for disability under this chapter
shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 2
years after the time of injury, except that if payment of
compensation has been made or remedial treatment has been
furnished by the employer without an award on account of
such injury a claim may be filed within 2 years after the
date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of
the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer.
§ 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1975) (emphasis added).
plain language, the statute is tolled by either (1) the
payment of "compensation" or (2) the furnishing of
remedial treatment by the employer. Supplemental benefits
constitute compensation. See Jackson v. Hochadel Roofing
Co., 794 So.2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
("Although the supreme court has not decided the point,
the First District has decided that supplemental benefits
payable when an injured worker becomes entitled to permanent
total disability benefits are 'compensation benefits
payable under this chapter.'") (quoting §
440.15(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991)). And it is undisputed that
Claimant last received payment of supplemental benefits less
than two years prior to the filing of the subject petition
fact that the last payment of compensation was provided by
the Division, and not the employer, does not matter under the
statute. The first of the two contingencies-payment of
compensation-is not modified by "the employer" like
the second contingency-the furnishing of remedial treatment.
Thus, the payment of compensation need not come from the
employer in order to toll the statute. Indeed, the final
phrase of the statute, "after the date of the last
payment of compensation or after the date of the last