final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Mark Borello,
Lamont Dickerson, pro se, Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant, James Dickerson, appeals a trial court order
summarily denying his postconviction motion brought pursuant
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. For the reasons
outlined below, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
between the late night of July 18, 2013 and the early morning
of July 19, 2013, the Appellant and his two co-defendants
arrived at a Motel 6 where the three victims had been
staying. According to one of the victims, the Appellant was
responding to a "back page" advertisement that had
been placed by one of the victims offering sexual services in
exchange for money. The Appellant called ahead to advise the
victims of his arrival and arrived at the motel sometime
between 3:00 and 4:00 in the early morning, when the third
victim had stepped out to go to the store. Upon entering the
room, the Appellant and his co-defendants produced firearms,
struck one of the victims in the head with his weapon, forced
the victims to strip, and restrained the victims.
the victims were restrained, the Appellant and one of his
co-defendants proceeded to sexually assault the two victims
multiple times while continuing to hold them at gunpoint.
During the course of one of these assaults, the Appellant
struck one of the victims in the head with the butt of his
pistol, and later struck her in the face with his fist.
the course of these events, the third victim returned from
his trip to the store. Upon his return, he was pulled into
the room by the Appellant and his co-defendants, struck with
a pistol, and restrained. They then robbed him and threatened
to kill him. The Appellant attempted to smother one of the
initial victims with a pillow, holding it over her face until
she had passed out. One of the Appellant's co-defendants
attempted to smother the other female victim with a pillow as
well. The other victim struggled, and the co-defendant used a
pistol to shoot her in the head. The bullet entered the right
temple and exited out of the left side of her head. The
Appellant and his co-defendants then lit the room on fire and
three of the victims survived, and the Appellant and his
co-defendants were apprehended. He was charged with two
counts of attempted first-degree felony murder (counts I and
II), one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter (count
III), three counts of kidnapping with a weapon (counts IV, V,
and VI), two counts of sexual battery with great force
(counts VII and VIII), one count of armed robbery (count IX)
and one count of arson (count X).
trial, one of the initial victims testified. She was able to
give a detailed description of the Appellant and his
co-defendants, and made an in-court identification of them,
as well as affirming a previously made identification given
to police. The third victim also testified as to his
recollection of the events of that night. A redacted
videotaped interview between the Appellant and investigators
from the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office was also shown to
the jury. In this video, the Appellant admitted to being at
the motel room and meeting with two of the victims.
August 21, 2015, a jury found the Appellant and his
co-defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced
the Appellant to life in prison for all counts save for count
III; and as to count III, the Appellant was sentenced to ten
years in prison. The trial court designated the Appellant as
a sexual predator in accordance with section 775.21(4)(a),
Florida Statutes, and as to counts III and X, the trial court
classified the Appellant as a habitual felony offender
pursuant to section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Lastly,
the Appellant was classified as a prison releasee reoffender
in accordance with section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes. This
Court affirmed the judgment and sentence. See Dickerson
v. State, 225 So.3d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Appellant now raises five claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that trial
counsel's performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the appellant. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Deficient
performance is performance which is objectively unreasonable
under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688.
Prejudice results when there is "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694. In sum, the Appellant
must demonstrate his trial counsel's performance was so
deficient as to effectively deny an appellant a fair trial;
mere speculation is not sufficient to grant relief. See
Maharaj v. State, 778 So.2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective
because his counsel did not file a motion for a mistrial
based on the Appellant's prior criminal record being
submitted into evidence. The basis of the claim begins with a
series of statements from the prosecutor made during the
trial. For example, the prosecutor asked, "[y]ou're
the only drug dealer in Jacksonville that goes around and
doesn't have a gun?" and "so you're doing
all this, you got no gun on you?" The Appellant replied
that "[t]here's a lot of people who serve don't
have guns" and "I don't carry no gun." In
the wake of these statements, the State introduced evidence
of the Appellant's prior criminal acts where he had been
convicted of being a ...