from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit,
Palm Beach County; Marni A. Bryson, Judge; L.T. Case No.
Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C. Geraghty,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven
Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
Appellant Gavin Washington Guy was convicted for the
first-degree murder of his girlfriend ("the
victim"). He now raises five issues on appeal. We affirm
on all issues raised but write to address Appellants
arguments concerning the trial courts limitation of the
defenses time for voir dire of the jury panel, and failure
to conduct a Richardson  hearing with respect to a
recorded jail house statement of Appellant that was
discovered and disclosed after trial had begun. Because we
find no reversible error, we affirm the trial courts
judgment and sentence.
Appellant lived with the victim, their children, and the
victims brother, notwithstanding the fact that the victim
had a restraining order against Appellant. On the night of
the tragic incident in question, the victim and Appellant had
an argument when the victim got home from work. Appellant
went into his bedroom and took a gun from his dresser. He
then confronted the victim and her brother, grabbed the
victim by her neck and started to strangle her. The brother
pulled Appellant off of the victim and, when Appellant
reached for the gun, the victim ran out of the apartment.
that evening, the victim sent a text message to her brother,
asking him to get her keys from Appellant. Appellant told the
brother that the victim would have to return and ask him for
the keys. When the victim did return, however, Appellant
refused to give her the keys. Instead, he followed her out of
the apartment and, as observed by a neighbor, walked straight
up to the victim and shot her in the chest, while she was
speaking on her phone to a 911 operator. Appellant was
arrested and charged with first-degree murder. His defense
was that the gun accidentally discharged during a heated and
pretrial scheduling order, the predecessor trial court stated
that each party would have ninety minutes for voir dire of
the jury pool. The predecessor court noted in the scheduling
order that "[i]f either side needs additional time,
counsel may approach the bench and indicate what important
topics and/or questions relating to the jurors
qualifications ... have not been reached and the amount of
time desired to accomplish those goals." Appellant filed
a written objection, submitting that ninety minutes was an
unreasonable amount of time in which to uncover any bias and
prejudice of potential jurors in a first-degree murder trial.
Appellant asked the court to "abandon or ease its
limitation of voir dire."
jury selection began six months later, the trial court stated
that it would impose the ninety-minute limitation, unless
"a real issue ... arises relative to not being able to
cover certain things." The trial court noted that both
parties had been given ample time "to structure [their]
questioning" and "use [their] 90 minutes."
State concluded its voir dire without requesting more time.
The following day, before defense counsel began his voir
dire, he renewed his objection, arguing ...