United States District Court, S.D. Florida
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO COMPLETE DISCOVERY
EDWIN
G. TORRES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on Zoraida Catano's
(“Plaintiff”) motion for an extension of time to
complete discovery. [D.E. 151]. Pauline Capuano's
(“Defendant”) responded to the motion on December
11, 2019 [D.E. 163] to which Plaintiff replied on December
18, 2019. [D.E. 165]. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is
now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the
motion, response, reply, relevant authority, and for the
reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion is
DENIED.
On
October 8, 2019, Plaintiff served Defendant with a second set
of interrogatories and a second request for production. The
purpose of these discovery requests was to gather information
on Defendant's domicile so that Plaintiff could provide a
meaningful response to Defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff's
discovery requests. Plaintiff therefore seeks an extension of
the discovery period so that the parties can attend the next
available discovery hearing and compel Defendant to provide a
response. If an extension is not granted, Plaintiff suggests
that she will unable to respond to the pending motion to
dismiss because it is unclear where Defendant is domiciled.
We
agree with Plaintiff that, generally speaking, a plaintiff
should be allowed to conduct discovery prior to a dismissal
of a case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d
727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982) (“We hold that the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
was premature. Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to
develop facts sufficient to support a determination on the
issue of jurisdiction.”); Blanco v. Carigulf
Lines, 632 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1980) (“We
merely hold that the rules entitle a plaintiff to elicit
material facts regarding jurisdiction through discovery
before a claim may be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.”).
But, as
the Court stated in the Order denying Defendant's motion
to stay [D.E. 153], the Court may retain jurisdiction over
this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. When Plaintiff
originally filed this case in federal court on January 18,
2018, Plaintiff relied on a federal question and a theory
that Defendant violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”). On July 11, 2019, the
Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the federal
question over which the Court had its original jurisdiction.
[D.E. 129].
After
giving Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, Plaintiff
included only state claims. The prior state law
claims were before the Court as supplemental claims under the
federal RICO statute. The question is then whether the Court
has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in
the amended pleading given the absence of a federal question.
The parties go back and forth on whether there is complete
diversity between the parties and whether discovery is needed
to resolve that question.[1] But, the dispute between the parties
misses the forest for the trees because diversity is not the
only alternative for the Court to retain jurisdiction.
The
Court may also inquire into whether there is supplemental
jurisdiction basis to support Plaintiff's state law
claims. The Court's inquiry is two-fold. “First,
the Court must decide whether it has the power to hear the
state law claims. Second, if the Court does have the power to
hear the state claims, the Court must decide whether, in its
discretion, it will retain jurisdiction over the state
claims.” Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of
Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725-26 (1966)).
The
question of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is
measured at the time the complaint was filed. See In re
Carter, 618 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1980). When Plaintiff
filed her initial complaint, she included a federal question
and her state law claims were a proper exercise of the
Court's supplemental jurisdiction. See28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) (1994); see also Palmer v. Hospital
Authority of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1567 (11th
Cir. 1994).
After
the Court dismissed the federal claim, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint. While this amended complaint only
contained state law claims, “[t]he dismissal of
[Plaintiff's] underlying federal question claim [did] not
deprive the Court of supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. Baggett, 117 F.3d at
1352 (citing Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1568; Edwards v.
Okaloosa County, 5 F.3d 1431, 1433-35 (11th Cir. 1993)).
“Indeed, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court has
the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims, where the
Court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, but is not required to dismiss the case.”
Baggett, 117 F.3d at 1352 (citing Palmer,
22 F.3d at 1567-68).
Here,
§ 1367(c) applies because the Court “has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction;”
namely, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant under the
federal RICO statute. See28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
“While § 1367(c) permits a court to dismiss any
state law claims where the court has dismissed all the claims
over which it had original jurisdiction, the court also can
consider other factors.” Baggett, 117 F.3d at
1353. The Court can consider, for example, judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity on the question of whether
the Court should continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See Smith v. City of Tallahassee, 2019
WL 5205969, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019) (“The court
should consider ‘judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity' in exercising its supplemental
jurisdiction.”) (quoting Rowe v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The
Eleventh Circuit has advised that the resolution of only
state law claims should generally be decided in state court.
See, e.g., Baggett, 117 F.3d at 1353
(“State courts, not federal courts, should be the final
arbiters of state law.”) (citing Hardy v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 954 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.
1992)). This is typically the case when a district court
dismisses a federal claim prior to trial. See, e.g.,
Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1994)
(remanding case to district court to dismiss plaintiff's
state law claims where court had granted summary judgment on
plaintiff's federal law claims); Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)
(“When federal law claims have dropped out of the
lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain,
the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction
by dismissing the case without prejudice.”); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)
(dismissal of state law claims strongly encouraged when
federal law claims are dismissed prior to trial).
But,
while a district should usually remand a case with the
dismissal of a federal question, this is not a mandatory
rule. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 at 350
(“[W]e have made clear that this statement does not
establish a mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all
cases.”) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 403- 405 (1970)). “The statement simply recognizes
that in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484
U.S. at 350 n.7. Therefore, although a district court
ultimately has discretion to retain a case, it should
consider these factors carefully in making that
determination.
In this
case, the Court has considered the factors articulated above
and finds that the better course is to retain jurisdiction.
The parties have litigated this case for approximately two
years and the Court is well aware of the claims presented.
Indeed, in granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court
recommended some of the state law claims that Plaintiff
should have pursued in lieu of a federal RICO claim. This
means that, although the federal claim is no longer present,
the state law claims are inextricably tied to the same
underlying theory of liability and are not so novel as to
justify dismissal. See Parker v. Scrap Metal
Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Generally, state tort claims are not considered novel
or complex.”).
Accordingly,
Plaintiff's motion for an extension of the discovery
period is DENIED because - irrespective of
whether the parties are diverse - the Court will retain, for
now, jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ยง
1367. Plaintiff shall file her response to ...