FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Mark S. Blechman,
Judge. Lisa T. Munyon, Judge.
S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Danielle R. Rufai, Assistant
Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene
Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Campbell appeals his conviction for DUI manslaughter. We
affirm, but write to address one of Campbell's arguments.
Campbell contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress blood test results obtained after the
alleged unconstitutional drawing of his blood. Our affirmance
is based on a different analysis than that employed by the
record reflects that on the evening of June 24, 2016, while
driving at an extremely high rate of speed during a heavy
rain, Campbell lost control of his vehicle and smashed into
the rear of a car that was stopped at a red light. A
passenger in the stopped car died as a result of injuries
suffered in the crash.
was subsequently charged by amended information with DUI
manslaughter and vehicular homicide. He filed a motion to
suppress all evidence derived from his blood
draw. Specifically, he argued that the blood
draw, obtained without a warrant, was unconstitutional under
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016),
because the implied consent warning given to him improperly
advised him that the refusal to consent to a blood draw would
constitute a criminal offense. In Birchfield, the
United States Supreme Court held that "motorists cannot
be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain
of committing a criminal offense." Id. at 2186.
suppression hearing, Officer Keane testified that after
conducting an investigation at the crash scene, he arrested
Campbell for DUI. It is unnecessary to detail Officer
Keane's observations of, and conversations with, Campbell
at the crash scene, or to set forth Officer Keane's
testimony regarding Campbell's performance on various
field sobriety tests. It is sufficient to state that Officer
Keane's testimony clearly supported the trial court's
finding that he had probable cause to arrest Campbell for
his arrest, Campbell was taken to a DUI breath testing
center. At the center, Officer Keane read Campbell an implied
consent warning and asked him to submit to a breath test.
Campbell submitted to a breath test and blew "triple
zeros," which indicated that he had no alcohol in his
system at the time. Campbell was then read an implied consent
warning for a urine test. (At the scene of the crash,
Campbell had admitted to the officer that he had used
marijuana earlier that day and had also taken various
prescription medications.) Despite consenting to give a urine
sample, Campbell subsequently indicated that he was unable to
urinate. Officer Keane considered Campbell's failure to
give a urine sample to be a "refusal," issued
Campbell a citation for refusing to submit to a urine test,
and advised him that his license was suspended.
at the DUI breath test center, Officer Keane learned that a
passenger in the car struck by Campbell's vehicle had
died. He advised Campbell that "someone has passed"
and that "[t]here may be a warrant or you can consent.
It's one of those things. But the State will probably get
your blood tonight." Officer Keane further testified
that he explained "the process" to Campbell and
that the State was going to get Campbell's blood.
being given an implied consent warning, Campbell consented to
a blood draw. Although the precise language of the implied
consent warning given to Campbell is not in the record, it is
clear that the officer was relying on section 316.1932(1)(c),
Florida Statutes (2016). That statute provides, in relevant
Any person who is capable of refusal shall be told that his
or her failure to submit to such a blood test will result in
the suspension of the person's privilege to operate a
motor vehicle for a period of 1 year for a first refusal, or
for a period of 18 months if the driving privilege of the
person has been suspended previously as a result of a refusal
to submit to such a test or tests, and that a refusal to
submit to a lawful test of his or her blood, if his or her
driving privilege has been ...