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Campbell v. State

Florida Court of Appeals, Fifth District

December 27, 2019



          Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Mark S. Blechman, Judge. Lisa T. Munyon, Judge.

          James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Danielle R. Rufai, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

          Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

          EVANDER, C.J.

         Douglas Campbell appeals his conviction for DUI manslaughter. We affirm, but write to address one of Campbell's arguments. Campbell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress blood test results obtained after the alleged unconstitutional drawing of his blood. Our affirmance is based on a different analysis than that employed by the trial court.

         The record reflects that on the evening of June 24, 2016, while driving at an extremely high rate of speed during a heavy rain, Campbell lost control of his vehicle and smashed into the rear of a car that was stopped at a red light. A passenger in the stopped car died as a result of injuries suffered in the crash.

         Campbell was subsequently charged by amended information with DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide.[1] He filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from his blood draw.[2] Specifically, he argued that the blood draw, obtained without a warrant, was unconstitutional under Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), because the implied consent warning given to him improperly advised him that the refusal to consent to a blood draw would constitute a criminal offense. In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court held that "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense." Id. at 2186.

         At the suppression hearing, Officer Keane testified that after conducting an investigation at the crash scene, he arrested Campbell for DUI. It is unnecessary to detail Officer Keane's observations of, and conversations with, Campbell at the crash scene, or to set forth Officer Keane's testimony regarding Campbell's performance on various field sobriety tests. It is sufficient to state that Officer Keane's testimony clearly supported the trial court's finding that he had probable cause to arrest Campbell for DUI.

         After his arrest, Campbell was taken to a DUI breath testing center. At the center, Officer Keane read Campbell an implied consent warning and asked him to submit to a breath test. Campbell submitted to a breath test and blew "triple zeros," which indicated that he had no alcohol in his system at the time. Campbell was then read an implied consent warning for a urine test. (At the scene of the crash, Campbell had admitted to the officer that he had used marijuana earlier that day and had also taken various prescription medications.) Despite consenting to give a urine sample, Campbell subsequently indicated that he was unable to urinate. Officer Keane considered Campbell's failure to give a urine sample to be a "refusal," issued Campbell a citation for refusing to submit to a urine test, and advised him that his license was suspended.

         While at the DUI breath test center, Officer Keane learned that a passenger in the car struck by Campbell's vehicle had died. He advised Campbell that "someone has passed" and that "[t]here may be a warrant or you can consent. It's one of those things. But the State will probably get your blood tonight." Officer Keane further testified that he explained "the process" to Campbell and that the State was going to get Campbell's blood.

         After being given an implied consent warning, Campbell consented to a blood draw. Although the precise language of the implied consent warning given to Campbell is not in the record, it is clear that the officer was relying on section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2016). That statute provides, in relevant part:

Any person who is capable of refusal shall be told that his or her failure to submit to such a blood test will result in the suspension of the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 1 year for a first refusal, or for a period of 18 months if the driving privilege of the person has been suspended previously as a result of a refusal to submit to such a test or tests, and that a refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her blood, if his or her driving privilege has been ...

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