United States District Court, S.D. Florida
BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants Florida
Department of Corrections (“FDOC”), John Willis
(“Warden Willis” in his official capacity as
Warden of the Charlotte Correctional Institution and
“Willis” in his individual capacity), Erika
McDermott (“McDermott”), and Shannon
Milliken's (“Milliken”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, ECF No.  (“Motion”). Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 
(“Response”), to which Defendants replied, ECF
No.  (“Reply”). The Court has reviewed the
Motion, all opposing and supporting submissions, the record
in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully
advised. For the reasons explained below, Defendants'
Motion is granted.
initiated this action on June 22, 2019, asserting claims
against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida
law, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in
and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. ECF No. [1-2]. On August
2, 2019, Defendants removed this action to federal court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See generally
ECF No. . Further, on September 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed
an Amended Complaint asserting four counts: Count I
(Negligence - FDOC); Count II (False Imprisonment - FDOC);
Count III (Civil Rights Violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 - Warden Willis); and Count IV (Civil Rights
Violation pursuant to § 1983 - Willis, McDermott, and
Milliken). ECF No.  (“Amended Complaint”).
Amended Complaint details facts regarding two state court
criminal cases against Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶
8-11. In case number 09-020587CA10A (“2009
case”), the state court, on August 29, 2013, pronounced
that Plaintiff would receive a sentence of 91.8 months in
Florida State Prison on each of the two counts alleged, with
credit for 374 days for time served. Id. ¶ 9.
The sentences in the 2009 case were to run concurrently.
Id. Moreover, the state court's written order
indicated that “the composite term of all sentences
imposed for the [counts] specified in this order shall run
concurrent and co-terminous with . . . [a]ny active sentence
being served.” Id. Additionally, on the same
day, in case number 13-004106CF10A (“2013 case”),
the state court imposed a sentence of 91.8 months in Florida
State Prison on Count I, and 60 months in Florida State
Prison on Count II, with the sentences running concurrently.
Id. ¶ 10. As in the 2009 case, the state
court's written order indicated that “the composite
term of all sentences imposed for the [counts] specified in
this order shall run . . . concurrent and co-terminous with .
. . [a]ny active sentence being served.” Id.
The state court, in both its written order and its verbal
pronouncement in open court, indicated that the concurrent
sentences in the 2013 case would run concurrent and
co-terminous with the concurrent sentences in the 2009 case.
Id. ¶ 17. Thus, the Amended Complaint alleges
that, “since both counts of each case were to be served
concurrent and co-terminous with the other, per the
court's written order and verbal pronouncement, the
sentence was 60 months.” Id.
to Plaintiff's sentencing, an office of FDOC
“negligently and improperly calculated Plaintiff's
release date. Although Plaintiff was plainly sentenced to
only 60 months, the FDOC negligent [sic] and incorrectly
interpreted the sentence as being 91.8 months.”
Id. ¶ 12. Upon realizing that he was being
incarcerated beyond the 60 months, Plaintiff filed a written
grievance on March 20, 2017, explaining that he was being
imprisoned beyond the term of his sentence, and this
grievance was received by all Defendants. Id. ¶
13. In March 2017 and February 2018, Plaintiff further filed
two writs in court, which were also provided to all
Defendants. Id. Further, upon receiving
correspondence from an attorney, which indicated that
Plaintiff was being incarcerated beyond the term of his
sentence, Defendants processed Plaintiff's immediate
release. Id. ¶ 15. At the time of his release,
Plaintiff had been incarcerated for less than 91.8 months.
Amended Complaint alleges that McDermott and Milliken
“had actual knowledge of the FDOC's sentencing
error, chose to ignore same, and did not take measures in
which they were duty-bound to take upon learning of
Plaintiff's wrongful imprisonment.” Id.
¶ 13. “While the initial sentence miscalculation
was error and negligence, once Defendants were placed on
notice of the error, their failure to respond or act amounted
to intentional misconduct or, at an absolute minimum,
deliberate indifference.” Id. ¶ 14.
instant Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, arguing that it fails to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that they
are entitled to sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial immunity,
and/or qualified immunity for the actions challenged in the
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed
factual allegations, ” it must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining
that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard “demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation”). In the same vein, a complaint may not
rest on “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. These elements are required to survive a motion brought
under Rule 12(b)(6) that requests dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general
rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and
evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in
favor of the plaintiff. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076,
1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v.
Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1353 (S.D.
Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal
conclusions, and courts “are not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty.
Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.
2006). Moreover, “courts may infer from the factual
allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative
explanations,' which suggest lawful conduct rather than
the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to
infer.” Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp.,
605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 682).
considering Rule 12(b)(6) motions, a court is “limited
to the four corners of the complaint.” St. George
v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
“A court may consider only the complaint itself and any
documents referred to in the complaint which are central to
the claims.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc.,
555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364,
1369 (11th Cir. 1997)). “However, [a] court may
properly consider documents that [a] complaint incorporates
by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.” Safeguard Support Servs., LLC v.
Nationwide Referral Servs., LLC, No. 11-61977-CIV, 2011
WL 13217971, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2011) (citing
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 11-61977-CV, 2012 WL 13006011, *1 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 11, 2012); see also Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[A] document outside the four corners of the
complaint may still be considered if it is central to the
plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of
authenticity.” (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304
F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002))); Fin. Sec. Assur.,
Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir.
2007) (explaining that a document outside the four corners of
the complaint may still be considered if “a plaintiff
refers to [the] document in its complaint, the document is
central to its claim, its contents are not in dispute, and
the defendant attaches the document to its motion to
their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because it fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on any of
the counts. Defendants also attach a number of documents to
their Motion that they argue are central to Plaintiff's
claims and are dispositive here. Further, Defendants argue
that the Amended Complaint should also be dismissed because
they are entitled to sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial
immunity, and/or qualified immunity. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, argues that the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint
sufficiently state claims for which relief can be granted on
all asserted counts. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that, under
the facts of the instant case, Defendants are not entitled to