United States District Court, S.D. Florida
BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants Carrot
Express Midtown, LLC (“Carrot Express Midtown”)
and Milop, LLC's (“Milop”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 
(“Motion”). Plaintiff Paula Rodriguez
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Response in Opposition to
the Motion, ECF No.  (“Response”), to which
Defendants replied, ECF No.  (“Reply”). The
Court has reviewed the Motion, all opposing and supporting
submissions, the record in this case, and the applicable law,
and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons explained
below, Defendants' Motion is granted.
initiated this action on June 27, 2019, in the Circuit Court
of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade
County, Florida, asserting claims against Carrot Express
Midtown, Milop, and Carrot Express collectively for
violations of the overtime and retaliation provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et
seq. (“FLSA”). ECF No. [1-2] at 8-13
(“Complaint”). On November 27, 2019, Defendants
removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). See generally ECF No. .
Complaint's sole allegation with regard to any of the
named Defendants in this action, set forth in the
“Juruisdiction and Venue” section, is that
“Defendant, CARROT EXPRESS MIDTOWN, LLC, a Florida
Limited Liability Company, having a place of business in
Miami-Dade County, Florida, where Plaintiff worked for
Defendant, and at all times material hereto was and is
engaged in interstate commerce.” ECF No. [1-2] ¶
4. No. specific allegations as to Milop or Carrot Express are
presented anywhere in the Complaint. See generally
Id. Rather, the remainder of the allegations in the
Complaint reference “Defendants” collectively,
without any further distinction. See generally id.
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “performed work for
Defendants . . . from on or about September 2018 to on or
about February 18, 2019.” Id. ¶ 7.
Plaintiff worked in excess of forty hours per week and
“performed an average of [five] hours or more of
overtime each week for Defendants.” Id.
¶¶ 8, 10. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff
at the required minimum wage and/or overtime rate for all
hours worked in excess of forty hours in a single week, which
Plaintiff continuously complained about. Id.
¶¶ 9, 11. “General Manager, Sebastian (LNU)
stated ‘We know it's illegal but that's just
how we do it here. If you don't like it, we can just cut
your hours to forty.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff
was ultimately terminated on or about February 18, 2019, in
retaliation for her complaints about Defendants' lack of
correct overtime payment. Id. ¶ 13.
Complaint asserts two counts, each of which are asserted
against Carrot Express Midtown, Milop, and Carrot Express:
Count I (FLSA Wage & Hour Violation) and Count II (FLSA
Retaliation Violation). See generally Id. Further,
despite incorporating the general factual allegations into
each Count asserted, the Complaint does not set forth any
factual allegations with regard to Milop or Carrot Express.
See generally id.
instant Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's
Complaint, arguing that it fails to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Alternatively,
Defendants move for a more definite statement pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).
Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed
factual allegations, ” it must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining
that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard “demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation”). In the same vein, a complaint may not
rest on “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. These elements are required to survive a motion brought
under Rule 12(b)(6) that requests dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general
rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and
evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in
favor of the plaintiff. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076,
1084 (11th Cir. 2002). However, this tenet does not apply to
legal conclusions, and courts “are not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cty.
Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir.
2006). Moreover, “courts may infer from the factual
allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative
explanations,' which suggest lawful conduct rather than
the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to
infer.” Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp.,
605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 682).
court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “may
consider only the complaint itself and any documents referred
to in the complaint which are central to the claims.”
Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959
(11th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.
1997)); see also Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[A] document outside the four corners of the
complaint may still be considered if it is central to the
plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of
authenticity.” (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304
F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002))).
Motion for a More Definite Statement ...