Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Cole

Florida Court of Appeals, Fifth District

January 3, 2020

HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., Appellant,
v.
ALAN COLE, Appellee.

         NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

          Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County, Edward L. Scott, Judge.

          Howard S. Marks and Sheena A. Thakrar, of Burr & Forman, LLP, Orlando, for Appellant.

          James P. Tarquin and Mark Dillman, of James P. Tarquin, P.A., Ocala, for Appellee.

          TRAVER, J.

         Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. ("Hobby Lobby") appeals a nonfinal order denying its motion to compel arbitration in a wrongful termination lawsuit filed by Alan Cole, a former employee. Hobby Lobby based its motion on a Mutual Arbitration Agreement ("the Agreement") the parties executed as a condition of his employment. The trial court found the Agreement unconscionable and denied the motion. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv). Because we conclude that the Agreement was binding, enforceable, and not unconscionable, we reverse.

         Mr. Cole applied for and obtained a cashier position with Hobby Lobby's Ocala store in 2015. He allegedly sustained a workplace injury in March 2018, for which he sought and received workers' compensation benefits. Mr. Cole suggests that Hobby Lobby then subjected him to antagonistic conduct, culminating in his discharge in May 2018. Mr. Cole then sued Hobby Lobby for improperly discharging him in retaliation for his workers' compensation claim. See § 440.205, Fla. Stat. (2018). Hobby Lobby moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement.

         The Agreement is a two-page, single-spaced document Hobby Lobby and Mr. Cole signed on July 27, 2015. The Agreement conditioned Mr. Cole's employment on his acceptance of its terms. The parties agreed that any employment-related dispute Mr. Cole had with Hobby Lobby, including "[d]isputes involving interference and/or retaliation relating to workers' compensation," would be submitted to and settled by final and binding arbitration. Mr. Cole could select from two sets of arbitration rules, and Hobby Lobby agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs. The parties acknowledged they had each read the agreement, gave up any right to sue one another, waived any right to a jury trial, and "knowingly and voluntarily consent[ed] to all terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement."

         The trial court denied Hobby Lobby's motion, concluding the Agreement was an unconscionable adhesion contract. It relied on Mr. Cole's affidavit, submitted in opposition to the motion to compel. Mr. Cole averred he had a high school education, and he did not know what an arbitrator or an arbitration was. He contended nobody explained he was waiving his right to a jury trial, offered him an opportunity to consult with counsel, or provided him with arbitration rules. He believed he had no choice but to sign the Agreement to get and keep his job.

         A trial court's ruling on a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed de novo. Krol v. FCA US, LLC, 273 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). We defer to the trial court's factual findings, provided they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Reunion W. Dev. Partners, LLLP v. Guimaraes, 221 So.3d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Courts generally favor arbitration provisions and try to resolve any ambiguity in favor of arbitration. Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So.3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2013).

         When evaluating whether to compel arbitration pursuant to written agreement, a court must consider: "(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived." Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (citing Terminix Int'l Co. v. Ponzio, 693 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)). Here, there is no dispute that Hobby Lobby met all three prongs of this test. The inquiry does not end here because general contract defenses also apply. See Glob. Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So.2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2005) (stating that the rights of access to courts and trial by jury may be contractually relinquished subject to general contract defenses, including unconscionability). In this case, the trial court found the Agreement unconscionable.

         To find an arbitration agreement unconscionable, a court must conclude it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So.3d 1145, 1158-59 (Fla. 2014). Although both types of unconscionability are necessary to invalidate an arbitration agreement, they need not be equally present, and courts should evaluate them independently. Id. at 1161. A sliding scale approach applies, meaning that the more procedurally oppressive the contract, the less evidence of substantive unconscionability is required, and vice versa. Id. at 1159-60. The party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden to establish unconscionability. Estate of Perez v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 23 So.3d 741, 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

         Procedural unconscionability relates to the manner in which a contract is entered, and courts determine whether it exists based on a totality of the circumstances. Fla. Holdings III, LLC v. Duerst ex rel. Duerst, 198 So.3d 834, 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing SA-PG Sun City Ctr., LLC v. Kennedy, 79 So.3d 916, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). The central question in determining whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable is "whether the complaining party lacked a meaningful choice when entering into the contract." Basulto, 141 So.3d at 1157 n.3 (citing Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condo., Inc., 398 So.2d 865, 868-69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). In answering this question, courts consider: "(1) the manner in which the contract was entered into; (2) the relative bargaining power of the parties and whether the complaining party had a meaningful choice at the time the contract was entered into; (3) whether the terms were merely presented on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis; and (4) the complaining party's ability and opportunity to understand the disputed terms of the contract." Id. (quoting Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1135 (11th Cir. 2010)). Courts should also consider whether each party, given their education, was given a reasonable opportunity to understand an arbitration agreement's terms, or whether important terms were "hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized." Id. at 1160 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).

         In predicating its finding of procedural unconscionability on the Agreement's take-it-or-leave-it nature, the trial court relied on California law. See Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 663, 669 (Cal.Ct.App. 2004) (holding that "[a]n arbitration agreement that is an essential part of a 'take it or leave it' employment condition, without more, is procedurally unconscionable"). In Florida, however, the take-it-or-leave-it nature of arbitration agreements is not dispositive. VoiceStream Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Commc'ns, Inc., 912 So.2d 34, 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (stating that "the presence of an adhesion contract alone does not require a finding of procedural unconscionability"). Instead, courts should explore the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.