Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Sheedy v. Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corp.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division

January 7, 2020

DONNA SHEEDY, Plaintiff,
v.
ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM SUNBELT HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT BOARD, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE and DOES 1-9, Defendants.

          ORDER

          GREGORY A. PRESNELL, PRESNELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint and Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 122). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in response to the motion (Doc. 126) and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 129). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss this case with prejudice.

         I. Background

         The Plaintiff, Donna Sheedy, filed suit against Adventist Health Systems[1] (“AHS”), the Adventist Retirement Board (“Retirement Board”), and the Adventist Retirement Plan Administrative Committee (“Administrative Committee”), seeking relief concerning the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital Retirement Plan (“Hospital Plan”). Doc. 116 ¶ 2. The Hospital Plan is a defined-benefit pension plan that was established in 1980 and suspended in 1992. The Plan is administered by the Retirement Board and the Hospital Plan Committee. The Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the Defendants violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).

         The Plaintiff first filed this lawsuit on October 28, 2016. Doc. 1. After identifying numerous deficiencies, including a failure to establish standing and incorrectly including certain defendants in various claims, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice. The Plaintiff then filed her Second Amended Complaint, later abandoning portions of those claims and leaving the Court to ascertain which parts of which allegations remained. On March 25, 2019, the Court dismissed the convoluted remains of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint without prejudice and gave the Plaintiff another chance to replead. Doc. 112. In that order, the Court warned the Plaintiff that she should “draft any amended complaint carefully, considering whether she truly intends to include each claim and defendant and avoiding shotgun-style pleading.” Id. at 3.

         In her Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 116), the Plaintiff added new allegations and legal theories, but has failed to overcome the deficiencies that resulted in the dismissal of her prior complaints. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint is also subject to dismissal.

         II. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint

         Count I is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and seeks declaratory relief that the Hospital Plan is subject to ERISA and an order directing the Defendants to bring the Hospital Plan into compliance with ERISA. Count II is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges violation of ERISA reporting and disclosure provisions with respect to annual reports against the Retirement Board and the Administrative Committee. Count III is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges violation of ERISA reporting and disclosure provisions with respect to notice of underfunding against AHS. Count IV is brought as a class action and alleges violation of ERISA reporting and disclosure provisions with respect to funding notices against the Retirement Board and the Administrative Committee. Count V is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges failure to provide minimum funding in violation of ERISA against AHS, the Retirement Board, and the Administrative Committee. Count VI is brought as a class action and seeks a civil money penalty against AHS, the Retirement Board, and the Administrative Committee. Count VII is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA against the Retirement Board and the Administrative Committee. Count VIII is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and alleges breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA by engaging in prohibited transactions against the Retirement Board and the Administrative Committee. Count IX is brought derivatively on behalf of the Hospital Plan and seeks declaratory relief that the Church Plan Exemption as applied to Defendants violated the Establishment Clause. Count X is brought as a class action and alleges breach of contract and seeks specific performance against AHS. Count XI is brought as a class action and alleges breach of fiduciary duty against the Retirement Board and the Administrative Committee.

         III. Legal Standards

         A. Motion to Dismiss

         In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, see, e.g., Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994), and must limit its consideration to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993). The Court will liberally construe the complaint's allegations in the Plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).

         In reviewing a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “courts must be mindful that the Federal Rules require only that the complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” U.S. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). This is a liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with particularity every element of a cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001). However, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for his or her entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-555 (2007). The complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” id. at 555, and cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).

         B. Standing

         To have standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”-an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Allegations of future injury can establish standing if the threat of injury is “certainly impending” or if there exists a “‘substantial risk' that harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; that is, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant rather than the result of independent action of a third party. Luja ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.