from the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cr-00093-TJC-JRK-1
WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
right to a jury trial means anything, it means a right to a
verdict based on the evidence. Indeed, the entirety of our
procedural mechanisms is geared to achieve this result: we
have trials so we can ensure all jurors consider the same
universe of evidence; we have an entire body of rules-the
Federal Rules of Evidence-devoted to controlling the
information on which jurors can rely in reaching their
decision; and we expressly instruct the jurors that they must
determine their verdict based on the evidence. Then, if a
defendant loses at trial, on appeal, we review the record to
be certain that sufficient evidence supports the verdict.
these things to try to ensure that only those proven guilty
based on admissible evidence will be convicted and to try to
prevent convictions that arise from prejudice or even
ostensibly noble reasons-such as a juror's belief that
God has told him to convict, irrespective of the evidence.
The consistent application of these practices underpins the
public's faith in the jury system and delivers due
process of law, an ideal in which our system of justice is
must steadfastly insist that a deliberating juror who is
incapable of reaching a verdict based on the evidence be
dismissed, regardless of whether that juror intends to
convict or acquit a defendant. If we do not, we guarantee
that, under at least some circumstances, a juror who is
unable to arrive at a verdict rooted in the evidence will
nonetheless be allowed to convict a defendant. That is
the district court became aware that during deliberations,
Juror 13 in Defendant-Appellant Corrine Brown's trial
made remarks suggesting he might not base his verdict on the
evidence adduced at trial. Specifically, Juror 13 informed
the other jurors at the outset of deliberations that
"[t]he Holy Spirit told [him]" that Brown was not
guilty on all counts.
district court questioned Juror 13 for a while, in the
presence of the parties, to ascertain whether Juror 13 meant
that he had prayed to the Holy Spirit for guidance and wisdom
in reaching a verdict based on the evidence-which would not
run afoul of the court's instructions to return a verdict
based on the evidence-or whether he meant instead that he
believed the Holy Spirit had "told" him to return a
certain verdict irrespective of what the evidence
showed-which would violate the court's instructions.
Based on Juror 13's responses and demeanor, the district
court concluded that Juror 13 was not capable of rendering a
verdict rooted in the evidence presented at trial but that,
despite his best intentions, Juror 13 would instead arrive at
a verdict based on his perceived divine revelation,
uninformed by the actual evidence. For this reason, the
district court dismissed Juror 13 from the jury.
no clear error in the district court's factual findings.
And for that reason, the district court certainly did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror 13 from the jury. To
hold otherwise would undermine our system of justice by
allowing jurors to return verdicts based not on the evidence
or law, but instead on a juror's perceived divine
revelation, irrespective of the evidence. Though here, the
juror's perceived divine revelation might have worked in
the criminal defendant's favor had the district court not
learned of it mid-deliberations, a contrary holding would
allow criminal defendants to be convicted based on a
divine revelation divorced from the evidence, rather than the
evidence presented at trial-a troubling result, to say the
least. And regardless of whether it works in favor of or
against the defendant, a rule that would allow a juror to
base his verdict on something other than the evidence would
be antithetical to the rule of law and is contradicted by
decades of precedent.
also raises a challenge to the forfeiture order the district
court entered. We find no error there, either. We therefore
affirm Brown's convictions.
federal grand jury issued a 24-count indictment charging
Brown with one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire
fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349), sixteen counts of mail and
wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, 1343), one
count of theft of government funds (18 U.S.C. §§
641, 642), two counts of engaging in a scheme to conceal
material facts (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)), one count of
engaging in a corrupt endeavor to obstruct the administration
of the Internal Revenue laws (26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)), and
three counts of filing a false tax return (26 U.S.C. §
charges related to One Door for Education-Amy Anderson
Scholarship Fund ("One Door for Education"), an
organization that purported to be a charity that raised funds
for, "among other things, scholarship assistance for
disadvantaged students and the purchase of computers to be
donated to schools." According to the indictment, Brown
and her alleged co-conspirators "used Brown's
official position as a Member of Congress to solicit
contributions to One Door for Education and to induce
individuals and entities to make donations" to that
organization for the stated charitable purposes.
upon receipt of the contributions, the indictment alleged,
Brown and her co-conspirators distributed a total of only $1,
200 for scholarships from the more than $800, 000 collected
for that stated purpose. The indictment further asserted that
Brown and her co-conspirators used the "vast
majority" of the remaining monies "for their own
personal and professional benefit." In particular, the
indictment charged that they used the funds to pay for
"a variety of personal expenses" such as
"luxury vacations," and "to pay for events
hosted by Brown or held in [her] honor," including
spending the monies for the use of luxury boxes at sporting
and concert events.
proceeded to trial on the charges. During jury selection, all
prospective jurors affirmed that they had no "political,
religious, or moral beliefs that would preclude [them] from
serving as a fair, impartial juror" in the case and that
they had no "religious or moral beliefs" that would
preclude them from "sitting in judgment of another
person." Then the selected jurors swore to "render
a true verdict, according to the law, evidence, and
instructions of this court, so help [them] God."
court elaborated on that promise, explaining that the
jurors' job was to "decide this case based solely on
the evidence [they] hear[d] in this courtroom." The
court then repeated its instruction twice more: "If you
didn't get it in this courtroom, you shouldn't have
it. If you didn't get it in this courtroom, you
shouldn't have it." In fact, the court further
emphasized that "our whole system depends on the fact
that the case is decided in this courtroom on the evidence in
this courtroom and nothing else," and that "every
single one of [the jurors] has that responsibility to make
sure that that's what happens."
the trial, the parties presented 371 exhibits and testimony
from 41 witnesses. On May 8, 2017, after the eight-day trial,
the court instructed the jury on the law. It told the jury
that its "decision must be based only on the evidence
presented during the trial" and that it "must not
be influenced in any way either by sympathy for or prejudice
against the defendant or the government." And, the court
said, the jury "must follow the law" as the court
explained it, "even if [the jurors] d[id] not agree with
the law," and "must follow all of [the court's]
instructions as a whole." The court explained that the
government's burden to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt required "real doubt, based on
[the jury's] reason and common sense after [ ] carefully
and impartially consider[ing] all the evidence in the
case." Then it emphasized that the jury "must
consider only the evidence that [the court] ha[d] admitted in
instructing the jury on the elements of the charged offenses,
the court told the jurors that they were the "judges of
the facts" and that their "only interest [was] to
seek the truth from the evidence in the case." Before
the jury started deliberations, the court identified the
alternates and ordered them to stay in the courthouse and to
continue to not discuss the case. The jury then began
wasn't too long before trouble began to brew. In the
evening of May 9, Juror 8 (who was not the foreperson) called
the courtroom deputy and reported that she and other jurors
had "concerns" about Juror 13. In particular, Juror
8 conveyed that from the outset of deliberations, Juror 13
had been speaking about "Higher Beings" in
connection with Brown's name. The courtroom deputy
immediately informed Juror 8 that she could not discuss the
matter with her but advised Juror 8 that she would report the
matter to the district judge, which she did. Once the
district judge learned of the problem, he communicated with
counsel about the situation that evening (May 9).
thing the next morning (May 10), the court convened a hearing
with counsel and Brown on the matter, where it stated for the
record what had transpired the evening before. At the
hearing, the district court stated, "[I]t is difficult
to tell how serious [the alleged problem] is. It-you know, it
could well just be part of the natural frustration or
dialogue or tensions that go on in any jury
deliberations." For this reason, when the government
asked the court to interview Juror 8, the district court
responded by asking, "[I]s there something less than
doing that, such as just readvising the jury on their duties
and responsibilities and having them resume their
deliberations that would be sufficient?"
both parties agreed that "it would [not] be sufficient,
given the circumstances, just to bring the jury in and to
remind them of their obligations." Defense counsel
remarked, "[T]here may not be a problem necessarily with
[Juror 13] . . . . There could be an issue with [Juror 8] . .
., if she was discussing this perhaps on the way in or the
district court acknowledged defense counsel's point that
"[i]t could be the first juror that's a
problem." Then the court "reluctantly" agreed
to inquire of Juror 8.
entered the courtroom, and the district judge instructed her,
Before I ask you any questions or talk to you, I want to make
sure that you know that I am not asking you to, nor should
you, state or reveal in anything you say your own opinions or
positions about any of the deliberations that you've been
having or any of the issues in this case, nor should you
disclose or discuss the opinions of any of the other jurors
about any of the deliberations that have gone on. So I want
to be clear about that.
court next asked the juror to share her concerns. Juror 8
related that she had memorialized her concerns in a letter,
which the court copied for the parties. The letter read,
With all due respect, I'm a little concerned about a
statement made by Juror #13 when we began deliberation. He
said "A Higher Being told me Corrine Brown was Not
Guilty on all charges". He later went on to say he
"trusted the Holy Ghost". We all asked that he base
his verdict on the evidence provided, the testimony of the
witnesses and the laws of the United States court. Other
members of the Jury share my concern.
the court and the parties learned of the contents of the
letter, the court asked Juror 8 some follow-up questions. In
response, Juror 8 said that Juror 13 had made the statement
about the "Higher Being" when the jury "first
went into deliberation" and that he had commented about
the "Holy Ghost" "shortly after, maybe within
a few hours after." Upon further questioning, Juror 8
reported that Juror 13 had not made any additional statements
to the same effect, that it appeared the juror had been
deliberating, and that nothing about the situation was
interfering with her own ability to deliberate in compliance
with court's instructions. Nevertheless, Juror 8
expressed concern that Juror 13's beliefs about a
"Higher Being" and the "Holy Ghost" were
"going to interfere in his ability to [deliberate in the
way that the court has directed]." Juror 8 also advised
that "[s]ome of the jurors are concerned that that's
affecting his-his decision."
in response to questions from defense counsel, Juror 8
explained that nobody had asked her to come forward with the
information, that she did not think the other jurors were
even aware that she had come forward, and that she learned of
the other jurors' concerns about the statements during
the deliberations, in Juror 13's presence. The court
thanked Juror 8 and instructed her to "keep this
discussion to [her]self." Then the juror left the
government then argued that the court should question the
foreperson. Defense counsel disagreed, asserting that no
further steps were necessary.
hearing the parties' arguments, the court noted that
"people pray for guidance and so forth," and that
doing so is permissible and "to be respected."
Nevertheless, it worried, "[I]f this juror is, in
effect, raising some religious view that would prevent him
from ever determining that a defendant was guilty on charges
or that Ms. Brown was guilty on charges, that is
problematic." Putting it in starker terms, the district
court wondered aloud what would have happened if Juror 13 had
instead said that he "trusted in the Holy Ghost to find
Ms. Brown guilty of all charges."
counsel then suggested that "if [Juror 13] can come out
and satisfy the court that he's willing to follow [its]
instructions on the law," the court should accept that
assurance. The district court responded, "Well, I am
certainly open to that possibility[, ] . . . but I think I
need to ask him."
court decided to question Juror 13. Juror 13 entered the
courtroom and the following colloquy ensued:
Court: Do you remember back when you were selected for the
jury that one of the questions that [the judge] asked you was
whether you had any political, religious, or moral beliefs
that would preclude you from serving as a fair and impartial
juror in this case? Do you remember that question?
Juror: I do.
Court: Okay. And I assume at that time that you answered that
question no, is that right, that you did not-
Juror: That is correct.
Court: Okay. And is that-is that still the case? Are you
having any difficulties with any religious or moral beliefs
that are, at this point, bearing on or interfering with your
ability to decide the case on the facts presented and on the
law as I gave it to you in the instructions?
Juror: No, [S]ir.
Court: Okay. Do you consider yourself to have been
deliberating with your other jurors according to the law and
the instructions that the court gave to you before you went
in to deliberate?
Juror: We have been going over all the individual numbers, as
Court: Yeah, I don't want to hear anything about the
Juror: Yes, [S]ir.
Court: But I'm just asking you: Are you-do you consider
yourself to be following the court's instructions in
terms of the law and how you go about what you're doing,
free from any influence of religion or political or moral
beliefs? Are you able to do that? Have you been doing that?
Juror: I've been following-I've been following and
listening to what has been presented and making a
determination from that, as to what I think and believe.
Court: Okay. That's fine. So let me get a little more
specific with you. Have you expressed to any of your fellow
jurors any religious sentiment, to the effect that a higher
being is telling you how-is guiding you on these-on these
decisions, or that you are trusting in your religion to-to
base your decisions on? Have you made any-can you think of
any kind of statements that you may have made to any of your
fellow jurors along those lines?
Juror: I did, yes.
Court: Okay. Can you tell me, as best you can, what you said?
Juror: Absolutely. I told them that in all of this, in
listening to all the information, taking it all down, I
listen for the truth, and I know the truth when the truth is
spoken. So I expressed that to them, and how I came to that
Court: Okay. And in doing so, have you invoked a higher power
or a higher being? I mean, have you used those terms to them
in expressing yourself?
Juror: Absolutely. I told-I told them that-that I prayed
about this, I have looked at the information, and that I
received information as to what I was told to do in relation
to what I heard here today-or this past two weeks.
Court: Sure. When you say you received information, from what
source? I mean, are you saying you received information from-
Juror: My Father in Heaven.
Court: Okay. Is it a fair statement-I don't want to put
words in your mouth. But are you saying that you have prayed
about this and that you have received guidance from the
Father in Heaven about how you should proceed?
Juror: Since we've been here, [S]ir.
Court: Do you view that in any way-as you know, when I
instructed you, I, as I do for-for all juries-you had told
[the judge] that you had no religious or any-you did not have
any religious or moral beliefs that would preclude you from
serving as a fair and impartial juror, nor did you have any
religious or moral beliefs that would preclude you from
sitting in judgment of another person. So you told [the
judge] that. And then you also-of course, you heard my
instruction, where you have to base your decision only on the
evidence presented during the trial and follow the law as I
explained it. Do you feel that you have been doing that?
Juror: Yes, [S]ir, I do.
Court: Do you feel that there is any inconsistency in the
prayer that you've had or the guidance you're
receiving and your duty to base your decision on the evidence
and the law?
Juror: You said a few-you said a few things. Repeat, please.
Court: Do you feel that there's any religious tension, or
is your religion and your obvious sincere religious
beliefs-do you believe it at all to be interfering or
impeding your ability to base your decision solely on the
evidence in the case and following the law that I've
explained to you?
Juror: No, [S]ir. I followed all the things that you
presented. My religious beliefs are going by the testimonies
of people given here, which I believe that's what
we're supposed to do, and then render a decision on those
testimonies, and the evidence presented in the room.
court instructed Juror 13 to wait outside the courtroom while
it conferred with counsel for both sides. The government
asserted that Juror 13 had admitted he was "guided by
what he believes a deity told him to do, and is apparently
implementing that, and not by the court's instructions on
the law." For this reason, the government argued, the
court should release him and seat an alternate juror in his
place. Although defense counsel disagreed, emphasizing that
Juror 13 had assured the court he was following the
court's instructions and did not say that he was
disregarding the court's instructions, he nonetheless
conceded that he could "understand the concern that the
court would have here with the statement about receiving
hearing out counsel, the court proposed asking Juror 13
directly, "Did you ever make the statement that a higher
being told me that Corrine Brown was not guilty on all
charges?" Neither party objected. So the court brought
Juror 13 back into the courtroom, and the following colloquy
Court: If you could just have a seat again, [S]ir. And I
appreciate your patience with us. And I-I want you to
understand I am not criticizing you or saying you did
anything wrong. We're just trying to figure some things
out here. So what I want to ask you is a fairly direct
Did you ever say to your fellow jurors or to a fellow juror
during your-during the time that y'all worked together,
when the 12 started, something to this effect, A higher being
told me that Corrine Brown was not guilty on all charges? Did
you say something like that? Did you say that or something
like that to any of your fellow jurors?
Juror: When we were giving why we were-insight, as far as not
guilty or whatever for the first charge, yes.
Court: Did you say the words, A higher being told me that
Corrine Brown was not guilty on all charges?
Juror: No. I said the Holy Spirit told me that.
Court: Okay. And you-and I don't want to get into your
deliberations. But at what point in the deliberations was
that? Was it at the beginning? Was it early in the
deliberations? When was it?
Juror: I mentioned it in the very beginning when we were on
the first charge.
court sent Juror 13 back to the jury room.
on this exchange, the government asked the court to excuse
Juror 13 and seat the first alternate juror. Defense counsel
disagreed. He argued the court should interpret Juror
13's statement as that of a person of deep faith
"saying that something he believed beforehand had been
reaffirmed by the evidence that he saw."
resolving the issue, the court noted that "a district
court should excuse a juror during deliberations only when no
substantial possibility exists that she's basing her
decision on the sufficiency of the evidence." Turning to
the facts, the court recognized that unlike in other cases,
Juror 13 had not announced that he was unwilling or unable to
follow the court's instructions. Rather, the juror
assured the court that he believed he was applying the
court's instructions properly. And, the court explained,
"the fact that somebody prays for guidance or is seeking
guidance from whatever religious tradition they come from is
perfectly appropriate and not a grounds to dismiss a juror,
necessarily." Nevertheless, the court announced that it
would excuse Juror Number 13 based on the following
In this case, Juror N[umber] 13, very earnest, very sincere,
I'm sure believes that he is trying to follow the
court's instructions, I'm sure believes that he is
rendering proper jury service, but, upon inquiry and
observing Juror N[umber] 13, there is no question that he has
made statements that he is, quote, receiving information from
a higher authority as part of his deliberative process, and
in response to the court's direct inquiry as to whether
he had said to other jurors, quote, A higher being told me
Corrine Brown was not guilty on all charges, closed quote,
Juror N[umber] 13 said that he-what he actually said was that
the Holy Ghost or the Holy Spirit told me Corrine Brown was
not guilty on all charges.
And a juror who makes that statement to other jurors and
introduces that concept into the deliberations, especially-
anytime, but this happened to be very early in the
deliberations, is a juror that is injecting religious beliefs
that are inconsistent with the instructions of the court,
that this case be decided solely on the law as the court gave
it to the jury and the evidence in the case.
Because, by definition, it's not that the person is
praying for guidance so that the person can be enlightened,
it's that the higher being-or the Holy Spirit is
directing or telling the person what disposition of the
charges should be made.
And based upon my reading of the case law in other cases
where religious beliefs have caused a juror to be struck,
this statement by the juror, which he forthrightly admitted
to, and which was accurately, apparently, recounted by Juror
N[umber] 8, who brought this to our attention, is a
And-and it appears to the court, looking and judging the
credibility of Juror N[umber] 13, that he was hesitant at
first to explain to me how his religious views have come to
the fore during deliberations.
But as we progressed and as he told me he received
information from a higher source, and then as he later
confirmed the actual statement that the Holy Spirit told him
that Ms. Brown was not guilty on all charges, that- that he
has expressed views and holds views that I think are
inconsistent with his sworn duty as a juror in this case,
because he's not able to deliberate in a way that follows
the law and instructions that the court gave to him.
I want to be very clear that I am drawing a distinction
between someone who's on a jury who is religious and who
is praying for guidance or seeking inspiration, or whatever
mode that person uses to try to come to a proper decision,
from this situation, where the juror is actually saying that
an outside force, that is, a higher being, a Holy Spirit,
told him that Ms. Brown was not guilty on those charges. And
I think that's just an expression that's a bridge
to[o] far, consistent with jury service as we know it.
I recognize that whenever you're in the area of religious
belief, and-and people who have different ways of expressing
their religious beliefs, that you're in territory
that's difficult to navigate.
But in my view, the record is clear, and that not only did
Juror N[umber] 13 make this statement, but it appears that he
continues to believe that he is being told by a higher power
how he ought to proceed in these deliberations, and he has
shared that with the other jurors, which, again, is
essentially a violation, not a-not a willful violation by
Juror N[umber] 13, but a violation of the court's
instructions to base the decision only on the law and the
facts that were adduced at trial, and in accordance with the
the court found "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
there was "no substantial possibility" that Juror
13 would be "able to base his decision only on the
evidence and the law as the court gave it to him in the
instructions" and that Juror 13 was instead "using
external forces to bring to bear on his decision-making in a
way that's inconsistent with his jury service and his
oath." In light of this conclusion, the court excused
Juror 13 for good cause.
because Juror 13 had been removed from the jury, the parties
agreed that the court should seat the first alternate in his
place. After the first alternate joined the jury, the court
instructed the jury to start deliberations anew, and the
jurors assured the court that they would do so.
jury notes and eleven hours of new deliberations later, the
jury found Brown not guilty on four of the fraud counts but
guilty on all remaining counts.
moved for a new trial. She argued the court wrongly dismissed
Juror 13 because there was a "substantial
possibility" that the "holy spirit was actually the
juror's own mind or spirit telling him that one or more
witnesses had not testified truthfully." The government
opposed Brown's motion.
written order, the district court denied Brown's motion.
Though the court once again acknowledged that "a juror
is fully entitled to his religious beliefs and may espouse
them," the court found that in this case, Juror 13's
"religious beliefs compelled him to disregard [the]
instructions [he had received from the court on the law and
how to evaluate the evidence] and instead follow direction
from the 'Holy Spirit' to find the defendant 'not
guilty on all charges.'" Indeed, the court
determined that Juror 13 "sincerely believed he had
received instructions from an outside source before
deliberations began about what his verdict should be . . .
." The court also specifically found that Juror 13's
"statement that he was following [the court's]
instructions did not convince [the court] that he was able to
do so." Juror 13's seeming "unaware[ness] of
the inconsistency" between following the court's
instructions and taking supposed direction from the Holy
Spirit "reinforc[ed] [the court's] belief that he
would be unable to follow the Court's instructions even
if [ ] again directed [ ] to do so."
addressing the defendant's claim that Juror 13's
statement was simply his evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence, the district court disagreed, calling this
assessment "a mischaracterization of the situation[,
]" since Juror 13 said "he had expressed a
conclusion from the beginning of the deliberations and
without discussion with his fellow jurors, in violation of
the Court's instructions." Plus, the court
continued, Juror 13's statements "necessarily had to
impact the overall deliberations because Juror [ ] 13 was
telling his fellow jurors that he was basing his verdict on
direction apart from those in the Court's
instructions." For all these reasons, the court
concluded "beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no
substantial possibility that [Juror 13] could base his
decision on the sufficiency of the evidence and the
the court emphasized that its decision did not suggest that
persons of religious faith were unsuitable for jury service,
but only that all jurors must "render a verdict based on
the evidence presented in court."
court sentenced Brown to serve an aggregate sentence of 60
months. It also entered a forfeiture and restitution order.
By that order, the court found that Brown had "obtained
$664, 292.39 in proceeds from the offenses of
conviction" and that she was "liable
individually" for that amount. Brown did not respond to
the government's motion for forfeiture and restitution or
object to the court's order.
appeal, Brown first argues that the district court's
decision to dismiss Juror 13 was reversible error. Her
contentions fall into four categories: (1) the district court
lacked a sufficient basis to inquire into Juror 13's
statements in the first place; (2) the district court abused
its discretion when, after questioning Juror 13, it found
good cause to excuse him; (3) Juror 13's responses during
the court's inquiry violated Rule 606(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence; and (4) the district court's dismissal
of Juror 13 constituted plain error because it violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and
Brown's First Amendment right to freedom of religion and
her Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict. After
careful consideration, we are not persuaded by any of these
begin with a review of the governing standards. Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3) allows the district court, on
a finding of "good cause," to excuse a juror after
deliberations have begun. "Good cause" exists only when
there is "no substantial possibility" that a juror
"is basing her decision on the sufficiency of the
evidence." United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d
1286, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). We have explained that in this
context, "substantial possibility" means "a
tangible possibility, not just a speculative hope,"
which "basically" amounts to "a 'beyond
reasonable doubt' standard." Id. at 1302,
"good cause" standard accounts for two competing
concerns: (1) it vindicates the defendant's right to a
unanimous verdict of guilt by ensuring that a court does not
dismiss a juror during deliberations because that juror
"'harbors [doubts] about the sufficiency of the
government's evidence[, ]'" United States v.
Oscar, 877 F.3d 1270, 1287 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (alteration added)); and (2) it "protect[s] each
party's right to receive a verdict rendered by a jury
that follows the law[, ]" United States v.
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 304 (3d Cir. 2007); Oscar,
877 F.3d at 1287.
review for abuse of discretion a district court's
decision to remove a juror during deliberations.
Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1302. And "we will reverse
the district court only if we find that it discharged the
juror without factual ...