United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
MORALES HOWARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Oshane Lawson, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action on July 5, 2017,  by filing a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (Petition; Doc. 1) with the United States District Court
Northern District of Florida. The Northern District
transferred the case to this Court on July 11, 2017.
See Doc. 3. In the Petition, Lawson challenges a
2010 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of
conviction for second-degree murder. Lawson raises one ground
for relief. See Petition at 5-8. Respondents have
submitted an answer in opposition to the Petition.
See Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Response; Doc. 29) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Lawson
filed a brief in reply. See Motion for Leave to
Respond and Response to Motion to Dismiss (Reply; Doc. 30).
This case is ripe for review.
One-Year Limitations Period
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013), the United States Supreme Court
held that a claim of actual innocence, if proven, provides an
equitable exception to the one-year statute of limitations.
The United States Supreme Court explained:
We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway
through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is
a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House,  or, as in this
case, expiration of the statute of limitations. We caution,
however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are
rare: "[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold
requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in
light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would
have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329, 115 S.Ct.
851; see House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064
(emphasizing that the Schlup standard is
"demanding" and seldom met). And in making an
assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, "the
timing of the [petition]" is a factor bearing on the
"reliability of th[e] evidence" purporting to show
actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332, 115
Id. at 386-87.
contend that this action is untimely. Response at 7-14. In
his Reply, Lawson argues that his failure to timely file the
Petition should be excused pursuant to Martinez v.
Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Reply at 2-3.
According to Lawson, he, himself, was ineffective for failing
to file his initial postconviction motion within the one-year
limitations period to toll the statute of limitations.
Id. at 2. Lawson also asserts that his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the ...