United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER 
POLSTER CHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Petitioner Shermykael Jenkins Sr.'s
(“Jenkins”) AmendedPetition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed on January 2, 2020. (Doc.
22). Jenkins instituted this habeas proceeding on June 21,
2019, as pretrial detainee being held in the Lee County Jail
in Fort Myers, Florida. (Doc. 1). Jenkins challenges his
arrest and pending state charges in case number 19-CF-15620
on two grounds. (Doc. 22). First, he argues he is falsely
imprisoned as a pretrial detainee on frivolous charges.
(Id. at 1-2, 6). Second, he maintains law
enforcement's search of his person and subsequent arrest
violated his Fourth Amendment. (Id.). For these
reasons, he says the state court improperly denied him bail.
Jenkins concedes he has not sought relief in the state court
on any of the grounds raised in his Amended Petition.
(Id. at 2-3).
state pretrial detainee, Petitioner may challenge his
confinement as unconstitutional under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
See Stacey v. Warden, Apalachee Corr. Inst., 854
F.2d 401, 403 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Pre-trial habeas
petitioners . . . are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of
whether final judgment has been rendered.”). However,
habeas corpus relief under § 2241 is available to a
pretrial detainee only if he has first exhausted his state
court remedies. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782,
812 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Among the most fundamental
common law requirements of section 2241 is that petitioners
must first exhaust their state court remedies.”)
(Tjoflat, concurring). Remedies are not considered exhausted
if any state procedures remain available to a petitioner.
See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.,
410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973). In particular, the petitioner is
required to pursue “one complete round of the
State's established appellate review process.”
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999). To circumvent the exhaustion requirement, a
petitioner must establish there is an “absence of
available state corrective process” or
“circumstances exist that render such process
ineffective to protect [his] rights.” 28 U.S.C. §
has neither alleged, nor demonstrated that he has availed
himself of Florida's “appellate review
process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
838, 845 (1999). To the extent he states counsel
“failed to follow [his] instructions on
appealing” his bond denial, the Court finds his rights
are intact through his legal representation. (Doc. 22 at 2).
Because the Florida courts have not been given a fair, full
opportunity to resolve Petitioner's pretrial detention
issues, this Court lacks authority to do so.
under the principles of comity and federalism, a federal
court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal
proceedings where the state court conviction and/or sentence
are not yet final. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) (holding federal courts are required to abstain
from interfering with pending state court proceedings except
under certain limited exceptions). Absent
“extraordinary circumstances, a federal court must
abstain from deciding issues implicated in an ongoing
criminal proceeding in state court.” Thompson v.
Wainright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983). If the
relief sought “would create an undue interference with
state proceedings, ” it is generally prohibited by the
Younger doctrine. Green v. Jefferson County
Commm'n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2009).
exceptions to Younger are very narrow and apply only
if “(1) there is evidence of state proceedings
motivated in bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur,
or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the
petitioner's constitutional issues can be raised.”
Hughes v. Attorney General of Florida, 377 F.3d
1258, 1263 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2004). At best, Petitioner appears
to argue the State is prosecuting him in bad faith because he
is innocent of his charges. Petitioner's conclusory and
vague assertion, however, is insufficient to demonstrate bad
faith prosecution. See Hudson v. Hubbard, 358
Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (11th Cir. 2009) (Younger
requires that a petitioner make a “substantial
allegation” showing actual bad faith) (citation
omitted). Consequently, lacking extraordinary circumstances,
this Court declines to interfere in the ongoing state
it is now
Petitioner's Amended Petition (Doc. 22) is
Clerk of Court DIRECTED to enter judgment,
deny as moot all pending motions, and close the case.
OF APPEALABILITY (“COA”) AND LEAVE TO FILE IN
is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner
seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement
to appeal a district court's denial of his petition.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district
court must first issue a COA. “A [COA] may issue . . .
only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Petitioner “must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong, ” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
282 (2004) or, that “the issues presented were adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)
(citations omitted). Upon review of the record, the Court
finds that Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in
these circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). Finally,
because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma